Rat u Iranu - kraj mula?

[suptil]

Jel su to Teheran i Haifa veceras ostali bez rafinerija?

[Angelia]

3 hours ago, suptil said:

Jel su to Teheran i Haifa veceras ostali bez rafinerija?

Teheran jeste, potvrdjeno, Haifa nema nikakvih izvestaja osim da je to verovatno wishful thinking IRGCja.

Ustvari izraelski mediji kazu da je bilo uzbune u Haifi, ali da nije bilo udara. Nema nikakve potvrde osim da je to izjava IRGC

[djura.net]

U Oslu je u bombaskom napadu nastradala americka ambasada.

 

A u Kuvajtu gori jedna od najvisih kula

 

[Klotzen]

Fox news emitovao snimke iz Ukrajine kako Ukrajinci uništavaju ruske dronove i rekao da su to američka uništavanja iranskih dronova. Već par dana su predmet sprdnje na mrežama i sinoć su se konačno korigovali i priznali laž.

[40Wins]

Quote

Glasnogovornik Garde Ali Mohamad Naini rekao je da je Iran do sada koristio rakete "prve i druge generacije", ali da će u nadolazećim danima koristiti "napredne i manje korištene rakete dugog dometa".

 

"Pali se mašina" 😄

[Angelia]

Ima dosta propagande pa za neke objave treba biti pazljiv, em propagande, ali I gresaka. Mali muzicki intermeco 

 

 

Ima scena koje su tuzne zbog zrtava rezima, ali je generalno slavljenje iranaca u dijaspori. Nadam se zbog divnog naroda Irana, da ce se osloboditi zlocinackog rezima.

 

[Gromovnik]

Da li to iranci ne smeju da objave ime novog vodje da ga mosad ne bi expresno pridruzio Hamneiju?

[Tex_Willer]

39 minutes ago, Gromovnik said:

Da li to iranci ne smeju da objave ime novog vodje da ga mosad ne bi expresno pridruzio Hamneiju?

Ili je Mosad saznao ko je pa je već ubijen ili ranjen.

[Angelia]

Danas je pogodjena jedna zgrada u Tel Avivu, 6 povredjenih.

Nista iz Haife, ipak je izgleda bila IRGC propaganda. 

[MeanMachine]

2 hours ago, Gromovnik said:

Da li to iranci ne smeju da objave ime novog vodje da ga mosad ne bi expresno pridruzio Hamneiju?

 

Izabran je njegov sin. @A sad zna bolje, ja pročitah da je sin tvrđa linija od pokojnog mu oca.

[suptil]

Bice zanimljivo videti prve mete koje je odobrio novi Ajatolah bas zato sto je radikalniji od prethodnog i zato sto ga vodi osveta tj. iracionalnost i emocija. 

[MeanMachine]

28 minutes ago, suptil said:

Bice zanimljivo videti prve mete koje je odobrio novi Ajatolah bas zato sto je radikalniji od prethodnog i zato sto ga vodi osveta tj. iracionalnost i emocija. 

 

Nemaju Iranci mnogo opcija, ovo sto su gadjali su gadjali. Mogu da zatezu oko Hormuza i tu Ameri bas nemaju neko resenje jer tesnac je manje od 100km sirok (deo koji Iran lako kontrolise). Dakle cak i neki sklepani dronovi mogu da lako pogode tankere. I to da ne koriste najopasnije oruzije, mine.

 

Americka mornarica odavno muku muci sa malim brodovima koji bi u ovom slucaju bili resenje. Flota minolovaca je smesna prosto neverovatno. Valjda su mislili da niko nece se usiduti da koristi morske mine u XXI veku?!?

 

Imaju cini mi se ni deset minolovaca i to skoro tri decenije matori.

 

Ali ono sto stvarno brine su najnovije informacije od iranskih zvanicnika, nadam se da je patka, ali navodno Iracani su uzeli za taoce neke americke vojnike. Dakle vrlo moguce da se opet aktiviraju sitske milicije u Iraku i da Trump kaze okej okupiramo Irak opet!?!

 

A era je fpv dronova. Pa to ce biti tek nesto manji masakr od Rusa u Ukrajini. 

 

Dronovi su buducnost, Iranci su dronovima ostetili katarski veliki radar od milijardu dolara ali i americki mobilni radar u Jordanu od 300 miliona dolara. Sumnjam da su na iste lansirali po 100 dronova.

 

Ali nek su lansirali i 100 dronova, svaki kosta npr 50.000$ dakle 5miliona dolara lansirano a osteceni radari od 300 i 1000 miliona dolara. Ovaj od 300 miliona je definitivno za otpis:

 

Inace ove drvene klocne su mi vrh. Oni ladno misle da zaustave Kinu a radare od 300 miliona dolara postavljaju na drvene klocne?!?

Edited 14 hours ago by MeanMachine

[suptil]

@MeanMachine Што се тиче банке мета апсолутно је сигурно да ће Израел гађати елетро постројења у Ирану. Са друге стране невиђена ескалација би била да да Иран погоди  Фабрике за десалинизацију воде у Изреалу а наролито у окружењу. Бахреин је слаба тачка мада и Емирати пролазе ко боси по трњу. Видећемо у наступајућој недељи како размишља Трамп под притиском петродолар искушњења. Негде сам прочитао да ће ове мање радаре заменити Американци брзо а читам и да Турска управо испоручује нешто Катару..

Edited 13 hours ago by suptil

[MeanMachine]

12 minutes ago, suptil said:

@MeanMachine Што се тиче банке мета апсолутно је сигурно да ће Израел гађати елетро постројења у Ирану. Са друге стране невиђена ескалација би била да да Иран погоди  Фабрике за десалинизацију воде у Изреалу а наролито у окружењу. Бахреин је слаба тачка мада и Емирати пролазе ко боси по трњу. Видећемо у нбаступајућпј не дељи како размишља Трамп под притиском петродолар искушњења. Негде са, прочитао да ће ове мање радаре заменити Американци брзо а чотам и да Турска управо испоручује нешто Катару..

 

Ovaj u Jordanu tesko da ce lako da zamene, mislim mogu ali imaju valjda 10 komada. A Iran opet moze da ga pogodi...

 

Dronovi su definitivno buducnost. Problem je sto vojno industrijski kompleksi sirom sveta to ne zele da prihvate. Jer dron kosta malo dakle ne mozes da skidas kajmak sa njima.

 

Katarski radar je tek specifican, to je cela jedna velika zgrada da kazemo trostrana piramida a Iranci su pogodili stranu koja je okrenuta ka Iranu (logicno):

 

 

Ukrajinci su ranije pogodili slican ruski radar ali taj je da kazemo "primitivniji" pa su ga Rusi brzo osposobili. Rusko resenje se sastoji od gomile obicnih antenica. Da laicki napisem ko da imas gomilu krovnih tv antena.

 

Ali na duze staze Iran nema sta da trazi u ratu sa Izrealom-Amerikom. To je vrlo jasno. Problem je sto Iran kontrolise hormuz. Plus sto ne bas mali deo kozervativnih u Iranu zeli kopneni rat sa Amerikom, a Ukrajina je pokazala kako se nosis sa mozda i najjacom kopnenom silom, tako sto ih satires dronovima koji su sastavljeni od kineskih aliexpress delova!

Edited 13 hours ago by MeanMachine

[Angelia]

Nadam se da nije tacno da Australija vraca ovaj fudbalski tim u Iran, gde ce biti mucene I ubijene 😪

Novi Supreme leader valjda nije omiljen ni od strane IRGC, tako da je mozda postao namerna meta. Cudan haos tamo, rekli su da je ozbiljno povredjen. 

 

Iranski proxies vode propagandni rat, sa svakakvim AI videima, gde tvrde da su napravili stetu tipa u Haifi, potopili Linkoln I sl. Sa lica mesta u Izraelu, promakli su neki projektili, uglavnom je steta materijalna, ostecene kuce I zgrade. Manje nego u proslogisnjem ratu. Nista strateski, nazalost bilo je zrtava, ali cini mi se da jos uvek stoji na ispod 20 poginulih. Sad valjda uglavnom bacaju cluster missiles. 

 

Bahrain valjda ima problem, jer imaju dosta Shiita koji su se pobunili. 

Katar objavio da izbacuju Hamasovce. 

[djura.net]

bbc

 

Stock markets have slumped and global oil prices have jumped above $100 (£75.02) a barrel as the escalating US-Israeli war with Iran has fuelled fears of prolonged disruption to shipments through the Strait of Hormuz.

 

 

cnn

 

Oil could rise to $150 a barrel by the end of March if travel through the strait doesn’t start flowing again, said Homayoun Falakshahi, lead crude research analyst at Kpler.

 

Surging oil prices have weighed heavily on stocks in recent days, as traders fear that a prolonged spike in fuel prices could lead to another spike in inflation and hurt the economy. Dow futures dropped more than 800 points.

[Tex_Willer]

7 hours ago, Angelia said:

Nadam se da nije tacno da Australija vraca ovaj fudbalski tim u Iran, gde ce biti mucene I ubijene 😪

Novi Supreme leader valjda nije omiljen ni od strane IRGC, tako da je mozda postao namerna meta. Cudan haos tamo, rekli su da je ozbiljno povredjen. 

 

Iranski proxies vode propagandni rat, sa svakakvim AI videima, gde tvrde da su napravili stetu tipa u Haifi, potopili Linkoln I sl. Sa lica mesta u Izraelu, promakli su neki projektili, uglavnom je steta materijalna, ostecene kuce I zgrade. Manje nego u proslogisnjem ratu. Nista strateski, nazalost bilo je zrtava, ali cini mi se da jos uvek stoji na ispod 20 poginulih. Sad valjda uglavnom bacaju cluster missiles. 

 

Bahrain valjda ima problem, jer imaju dosta Shiita koji su se pobunili. 

Katar objavio da izbacuju Hamasovce. 

Novi ajatolah jeste struja koju postavlja garda i ima vrlo bliske odnose sa njima.

 

Još je tvrdja linija od oca, barem je takav bio tokom svog veka, e sad ako je istina da mu pragmaticnost nije jača strana, onda je to tek problematicno.

 

Zanimljivo i drugi kandidat koji je bio blizu stolice ajatolaha je bio iz najtvrdje struje.

[40Wins]

Ima li na kladži dokad će ovaj da se guzi u bunkeru.

[Barkley#34]

I da nije bio najtvrđa struja postao bi nakon što su mu roknuli roditelje, ženu i sina. Dobra strana je u tome što mu je smanjen manevarski prostor, bar se nadam da je tako.

[melankolic]

1 hour ago, 40Wins said:

Ima li na kladži dokad će ovaj da se guzi u bunkeru.

Između 4 nedelje (po Krasnovu) i 6 meseci (po iranskoj vojsci).

Posle možda dovedu nekog novog.

Nadživeće islamisti i Krasnova i Netanjahua, i doći će još gori (slično kao u Avganistanu) samo što ovi to ne kapiraju.

[40Wins]

25 minutes ago, melankolic said:

Između 4 nedelje (po Krasnovu) i 6 meseci (po iranskoj vojsci).

Posle možda dovedu nekog novog.

Nadživeće islamisti i Krasnova i Netanjahua, i doći će još gori (slično kao u Avganistanu) samo što ovi to ne kapiraju.

 

Nakon ovoga doci ce neko gori ili neko bolji, to ne znamo, ali da se intervencija nije desila ono sto sigurno znamo je da bi iranska vlast ostala verni snabdevac nafte kineske komunisticke partije, verni snabdevac vojne opreme FSB-a, i verni finansijer dzihadistickih grupa sirom Bliskog istoka. Stvari su se pokrenule sa mrtve tacke i danas postoji nada u slom Iranske revolucionarne garde. 

[Angelia]

29 minutes ago, 40Wins said:

 

Nakon ovoga doci ce neko gori ili neko bolji, to ne znamo, ali da se intervencija nije desila ono sto sigurno znamo je da bi iranska vlast ostala verni snabdevac nafte kineske komunisticke partije, verni snabdevac vojne opreme FSB-a, i verni finansijer dzihadistickih grupa sirom Bliskog istoka. Stvari su se pokrenule sa mrtve tacke i danas postoji nada u slom Iranske revolucionarne garde. 

I da bi se jos vise naoruzali I bila veca opasnost za region. To vidimo iz napada po regionu. 

Btw ja mislim da mu damo par dana u bunkeru, iako ne bi me iznenadilo da je on samo distraction 

[Bul-Kathos]

Godfather strukturalnog realizma Kenet Volc je još u 2012. godini izneo argumente da bi nuklearno naoružavanje Irana proizvelo stratešku stabilnost na Bliskom istoku. Tokom vremena, ova teza je pokazala da postoji više mogućnsoti da ravnoteža snaga dovede do mira nego obrnuto. Glavna negativna posledica je vrlo moguća nuklearna proliferacija ostalih aktera na Bliskom istoku ali i šire.

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/2012-06-15/why-iran-should-get-bomb

 

Spoiler

Why Iran Should Get the Bomb

Nuclear Balancing Would Mean Stability

Kenneth N. Waltz

July/August 2012 Published on June 15, 2012

A demonstrator in Tehran, February 2012 Caren Firouz / Reuters

KENNETH N. WALTZ is Senior Research Scholar at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies.

More by Kenneth N. Waltz

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The past several months have witnessed a heated debate over the best way for the United States and Israel to respond to Iran's nuclear activities. As the argument has raged, the United States has tightened its already robust sanctions regime against the Islamic Republic, and the European Union announced in January that it will begin an embargo on Iranian oil on July 1. Although the United States, the EU, and Iran have recently returned to the negotiating table, a palpable sense of crisis still looms. 

It should not. Most U.S., European, and Israeli commentators and policymakers warn that a nuclear-armed Iran would be the worst possible outcome of the current standoff. In fact, it would probably be the best possible result: the one most likely to restore stability to the Middle East. 

POWER BEGS TO BE BALANCED

The crisis over Iran's nuclear program could end in three different ways. First, diplomacy coupled with serious sanctions could convince Iran to abandon its pursuit of a nuclear weapon. But this outcome is unlikely: the historical record indicates that a country bent on acquiring nuclear weapons can rarely be dissuaded from doing so. Punishing a state through economic sanctions does not inexorably derail its nuclear program. Take North Korea, which succeeded in building its weapons despite countless rounds of sanctions and UN Security Council resolutions. If Tehran determines that its security depends on possessing nuclear weapons, sanctions are unlikely to change its mind. In fact, adding still more sanctions now could make Iran feel even more vulnerable, giving it still more reason to seek the protection of the ultimate deterrent. 

The second possible outcome is that Iran stops short of testing a nuclear weapon but develops a breakout capability, the capacity to build and test one quite quickly. Iran would not be the first country to acquire a sophisticated nuclear program without building an actual bomb. Japan, for instance, maintains a vast civilian nuclear infrastructure. Experts believe that it could produce a nuclear weapon on short notice. 

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Such a breakout capability might satisfy the domestic political needs of Iran's rulers by assuring hard-liners that they can enjoy all the benefits of having a bomb (such as greater security) without the downsides (such as international isolation and condemnation). The problem is that a breakout capability might not work as intended. 

The United States and its European allies are primarily concerned with weaponization, so they might accept a scenario in which Iran stops short of a nuclear weapon. Israel, however, has made it clear that it views a significant Iranian enrichment capacity alone as an unacceptable threat. It is possible, then, that a verifiable commitment from Iran to stop short of a weapon could appease major Western powers but leave the Israelis unsatisfied. Israel would be less intimidated by a virtual nuclear weapon than it would be by an actual one and therefore would likely continue its risky efforts at subverting Iran's nuclear program through sabotage and assassination—which could lead Iran to conclude that a breakout capability is an insufficient deterrent, after all, and that only weaponization can provide it with the security it seeks. 

A nuclear-armed Iran would likely restore stability to the Middle East.

The third possible outcome of the standoff is that Iran continues its current course and publicly goes nuclear by testing a weapon. U.S. and Israeli officials have declared that outcome unacceptable, arguing that a nuclear Iran is a uniquely terrifying prospect, even an existential threat. Such language is typical of major powers, which have historically gotten riled up whenever another country has begun to develop a nuclear weapon of its own. Yet so far, every time another country has managed to shoulder its way into the nuclear club, the other members have always changed tack and decided to live with it. In fact, by reducing imbalances in military power, new nuclear states generally produce more regional and international stability, not less. 

Israel's regional nuclear monopoly, which has proved remarkably durable for the past four decades, has long fueled instability in the Middle East. In no other region of the world does a lone, unchecked nuclear state exist. It is Israel's nuclear arsenal, not Iran's desire for one, that has contributed most to the current crisis. Power, after all, begs to be balanced. What is surprising about the Israeli case is that it has taken so long for a potential balancer to emerge. 

Of course, it is easy to understand why Israel wants to remain the sole nuclear power in the region and why it is willing to use force to secure that status. In 1981, Israel bombed Iraq to prevent a challenge to its nuclear monopoly. It did the same to Syria in 2007 and is now considering similar action against Iran. But the very acts that have allowed Israel to maintain its nuclear edge in the short term have prolonged an imbalance that is unsustainable in the long term. Israel's proven ability to strike potential nuclear rivals with impunity has inevitably made its enemies anxious to develop the means to prevent Israel from doing so again. In this way, the current tensions are best viewed not as the early stages of a relatively recent Iranian nuclear crisis but rather as the final stages of a decades-long Middle East nuclear crisis that will end only when a balance of military power is restored.

UNFOUNDED FEARS

One reason the danger of a nuclear Iran has been grossly exaggerated is that the debate surrounding it has been distorted by misplaced worries and fundamental misunderstandings of how states generally behave in the international system. The first prominent concern, which undergirds many others, is that the Iranian regime is innately irrational. Despite a widespread belief to the contrary, Iranian policy is made not by "mad mullahs" but by perfectly sane ayatollahs who want to survive just like any other leaders. Although Iran's leaders indulge in inflammatory and hateful rhetoric, they show no propensity for self-destruction. It would be a grave error for policymakers in the United States and Israel to assume otherwise. 

Yet that is precisely what many U.S. and Israeli officials and analysts have done. Portraying Iran as irrational has allowed them to argue that the logic of nuclear deterrence does not apply to the Islamic Republic. If Iran acquired a nuclear weapon, they warn, it would not hesitate to use it in a first strike against Israel, even though doing so would invite massive retaliation and risk destroying everything the Iranian regime holds dear. 

Although it is impossible to be certain of Iranian intentions, it is far more likely that if Iran desires nuclear weapons, it is for the purpose of providing for its own security, not to improve its offensive capabilities (or destroy itself). Iran may be intransigent at the negotiating table and defiant in the face of sanctions, but it still acts to secure its own preservation. Iran's leaders did not, for example, attempt to close the Strait of Hormuz despite issuing blustery warnings that they might do so after the EU announced its planned oil embargo in January. The Iranian regime clearly concluded that it did not want to provoke what would surely have been a swift and devastating American response to such a move.

If Iran goes nuclear, Israel and Iran will deter each other, as nuclear powers always have.

Nevertheless, even some observers and policymakers who accept that the Iranian regime is rational still worry that a nuclear weapon would embolden it, providing Tehran with a shield that would allow it to act more aggressively and increase its support for terrorism. Some analysts even fear that Iran would directly provide terrorists with nuclear arms. The problem with these concerns is that they contradict the record of every other nuclear weapons state going back to 1945. History shows that when countries acquire the bomb, they feel increasingly vulnerable and become acutely aware that their nuclear weapons make them a potential target in the eyes of major powers. This awareness discourages nuclear states from bold and aggressive action. Maoist China, for example, became much less bellicose after acquiring nuclear weapons in 1964, and India and Pakistan have both become more cautious since going nuclear. There is little reason to believe Iran would break this mold. 

As for the risk of a handoff to terrorists, no country could transfer nuclear weapons without running a high risk of being found out. U.S. surveillance capabilities would pose a serious obstacle, as would the United States' impressive and growing ability to identify the source of fissile material. Moreover, countries can never entirely control or even predict the behavior of the terrorist groups they sponsor. Once a country such as Iran acquires a nuclear capability, it will have every reason to maintain full control over its arsenal. After all, building a bomb is costly and dangerous. It would make little sense to transfer the product of that investment to parties that cannot be trusted or managed. 

Another oft-touted worry is that if Iran obtains the bomb, other states in the region will follow suit, leading to a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. But the nuclear age is now almost 70 years old, and so far, fears of proliferation have proved to be unfounded. Properly defined, the term "proliferation" means a rapid and uncontrolled spread. Nothing like that has occurred; in fact, since 1970, there has been a marked slowdown in the emergence of nuclear states. There is no reason to expect that this pattern will change now. Should Iran become the second Middle Eastern nuclear power since 1945, it would hardly signal the start of a landslide. When Israel acquired the bomb in the 1960s, it was at war with many of its neighbors. Its nuclear arms were a much bigger threat to the Arab world than Iran's program is today. If an atomic Israel did not trigger an arms race then, there is no reason a nuclear Iran should now.

REST ASSURED

In 1991, the historical rivals India and Pakistan signed a treaty agreeing not to target each other's nuclear facilities. They realized that far more worrisome than their adversary's nuclear deterrent was the instability produced by challenges to it. Since then, even in the face of high tensions and risky provocations, the two countries have kept the peace. Israel and Iran would do well to consider this precedent. If Iran goes nuclear, Israel and Iran will deter each other, as nuclear powers always have. There has never been a full-scale war between two nuclear-armed states. Once Iran crosses the nuclear threshold, deterrence will apply, even if the Iranian arsenal is relatively small. No other country in the region will have an incentive to acquire its own nuclear capability, and the current crisis will finally dissipate, leading to a Middle East that is more stable than it is today. 

For that reason, the United States and its allies need not take such pains to prevent the Iranians from developing a nuclear weapon. Diplomacy between Iran and the major powers should continue, because open lines of communication will make the Western countries feel better able to live with a nuclear Iran. But the current sanctions on Iran can be dropped: they primarily harm ordinary Iranians, with little purpose. 

Most important, policymakers and citizens in the Arab world, Europe, Israel, and the United States should take comfort from the fact that history has shown that where nuclear capabilities emerge, so, too, does stability. When it comes to nuclear weapons, now as ever, more may be better.

 

[Nek grmi jako]

Da, to sve itekako ima smisla.

 

Pominjali smo tu mogućnost balansa, kao i da bi tada zalivske zemlje odmah stale u red, prva Saudijska Arabija. Imaju da plate, a imali bi skoro sigurno i političku volju. I Turska, naravno.

Edited 48 minutes ago by Nek grmi jako

[melankolic]

1 hour ago, 40Wins said:

 

Nakon ovoga doci ce neko gori ili neko bolji, to ne znamo, ali da se intervencija nije desila ono sto sigurno znamo je da bi iranska vlast ostala verni snabdevac nafte kineske komunisticke partije, verni snabdevac vojne opreme FSB-a, i verni finansijer dzihadistickih grupa sirom Bliskog istoka. Stvari su se pokrenule sa mrtve tacke i danas postoji nada u slom Iranske revolucionarne garde. 

Čitao sam malo o tome kakvi su sve scenarii mogući nakon intervencije ukoliko mule padnu, i za razliku od srpskih experata za sve i svašta na ovoj planeti (a izašlo iz udbaške-FPN- kuhinje) u jednom političkom časopisu pišu (iz više izvora stručnjaka sa Zapada) da je moguć još gori scenario a to je da mule zadrže deo zemlje pod svojom upravom a da razne ekstremističke grupe preuzmu ostale delove teritorije. Poenta je da se intervencijom može dovesti u opasnost suverenost zemlje na način da dođe do ujedinjenja raznih hamasa-hezbolaha-i-islamskih džihada i širenje opasnosti za Izrael sa manjih teritorija.

Ok je to da ti smatraš da će Kina propasti bez iranske nafte, da Ruje neće više gađati dronovima Ukrajince ali sve to pada u vodu dok Krasnov pravi dealove s njima. 

 

Edited 42 minutes ago by melankolic