Vox Populi - Vox Dei

[Don Dusko]

Lepo se Vucic pokenjao po sportistima koji su podrzali protest.

Voditelj mu pomenuo Bogdana i Zeljka.

 

A on fazonu koga briga za te sutace loptice.

[Clash]

 

[Don Dusko]

Kad su Bogdan i kompanija trebala za promociju Vucko sav ozaren i prigrljavao ih.Kao ovo je uspeh Srbije i treba ih pratiti.

Sad kad je Bogdan podrzao proteste koga boli briga za prebacivace loptice.I sta oni misle. Je li  oni znaju kako razgovarati sa Zelenskim i Putinom?!

Edited December 26, 2024 by Don Dusko

[wrach]

Malopre sam slusao hirurga koji je jedan u nizu sikaniranih od strane kartela.

 

I jedna situacija koju je ispricao je izazvala u meni odvratan koktel emocija i jos jednom dokazala da je za istinsku promenu u ovom ovde podneblju koje se naziva drzava potrebno MNOGO vise nego sto iko moze i da zamisli.

 

Naime njega su u toku operacije, u krucijalnom trenutku, 2 puta prekidali i insistirali da hitno dodje kod direktora na razgovor. 

Taj stav, mentalitet, nedostatak empatije, ljudskosti i kulture je nesto sto mnogo "ljudi" na ovom podneblju ima. I cak i u idealnom slucaju da sva ova javna lica krivicno odgovaraju, ostace mnogo skrivenih "ljudi" koji ce i dalje realno biti problem.

[DJ_Vasa]

Ludilo uzima maha:

 

Vučić najavio borbu protiv korupcije: Veliki narodni pokret od 15. marta

 

Može lepo da ga formira sa SNS-om, Ristovskim, Goncićem, A(n)drijanom Krtolicom (koja se u javnosti predstavlja kao Aja Jung ili Jaja Ung, nikako da zapamtim ), Prvoslavom Perićem (AKA Profitije ili Porfirije), porodicom ĐoCOVID (sa ili bez čuvenog tapkača lopice), Jelenom Kerušom (ili kako beše, Kur.. Kar...leuša), DJ Žexom plemenitim Mitrovićem, lupačem lopte sa titulom koze (eng. goat = koza) Jokićem, Acom Bosancem i ostalom bagrom.

 

Ima vremena do marta, a znajući da se pomenuta ekipa vodi ideologijom $$$, ne bi me začudilo da ga se prvi odreknu. Jedan bradati govnar je to već učinio.

[Clash]

Kaze Aco srbin da mu je sin dobar i emotivan i da mu je doneo sliku raspadnutog porodilista u Pancevu i da ga je pitao sta je ovo bre i da nije dva dana pricao sa njim sok nije to sredio i ako mu je objasnio sta je sve on izgradio od bolnica (i nama je ponovio naravno)

Ja sam pustio jednu suzu i odlucio da glasam za SNS na sledecim izborima.

[Smrtokapa]

3 hours ago, Drug Crni said:

Ovo ne može biti netačnije.

 

3 hours ago, SuperTraktorko said:

Jel tako? Hajmo onda da čujemo argumente...

 

Kome je zanimljiva tematika, može se poslužiti i ovim poglavljem iz knjige Empires and Bureaucracy in World History.

Poglavlje: The Ottoman Empire (1299–1923): The Bureaucratization of Patrimonial Authority

Deo II: Ottoman Bureaucracy: Its Reach and Significance

Autorka: Karen Barkey, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Karen_Barkey

 

Quote

In his classic book, Halil İnalcık, the foremost historian of the Ottoman empire, asserted that ‘the thousands of registers and literally millions of documents still preserved in Turkish archives are proof that the Ottoman empire was a bureaucratic state.’ Was this voluminous amount of parchment, produced by bureaucrats of various function and rank, both a cause and a result of the empire’s astonishing longevity and its ability to successfully and efficiently administer its lands?
The Ottoman bureaucracy is defined here as the men who were paid to manage the affairs of the government: specifically the members of the scribal service and financial officers (kalemiye), along with the ubiquitous secretaries who accompanied every bureau in the empire. While the kalemiye represented the bureaucracy in a narrow sense, more generally the administration of the empire in its core regions – the provinces in Anatolia and the Balkans, known respectively as Anadolu and Rumeli – possessed many features that were bureaucratic. Most of the economic institutions (customs, construction, mining and other enterprises) and military organizations (Janissaries, arsenals and fortresses), as well as the religio-economic associations such as the religious endowments (vakifs), all had numerous staff, secretaries and officials to handle accounts, records and regular organizational tasks.
It is not until the reign of Süleyman in the sixteenth century that the kalemiye and the government as a whole may properly be called a bureaucracy. As the Ottoman armies pushed west into Hungary and Austria and south and east to the Indian Ocean, the influx of new territories brought about increases in the bureaucracy’s size, influence and degrees of specialization and professionalization. So while the origins of the Ottoman bureaucracy lay in the patrimonial house of the sultan and while its general contours reflect this fact, the administration developed characteristics of an impersonal, predictable and rationalized organization as it expanded. This process of bureaucratization did not come about immediately or easily. It took time, and people continued to rely on patrimonial relations to advance in rank while adopting bureaucratic styles.
The transition mostly took place during Süleyman’s reign, although, once established, bureaucracy continued to coexist with elements of patrimonialism for centuries. Practically, the goals of maintaining order, the provision of services, the collection of revenues and preservation of dynastic rule called for extensive routinization and coordination, as well as a system of checks and balances. In fact, the theoretical achievement of the sultan’s absolute authority and his delegation was the prevention of arbitrary power. Cornell Fleischer
describes the relationship concisely: ‘The Palace class of servitors to which the Kanunname gave order was in fact the patrimonial household made government, enlarged, rationalized, bureaucratized, and refined’ – in other words, the bureaucratization of patrimonial authority.
Looking at the core regions of the empire, we quickly get a sense of the bureaucratic features of Ottoman rule that had formed by the end of the sixteenth century. In these regions, administrators and judges were appointed from the capital on a rotating basis, rules of office were codified and passed down, training was formalized, career lines and hierarchies were present, and universalistic principles as well as an ‘ethos’ of office – being an Ottoman bureaucrat – were all in evidence. Elements of the system – which had roots in the traditions of Near Eastern and Islamic governance as well as Byzantine land practices – were already discernable in the fourteenth century when the house of Osman was still an Anatolian principality.
The practical tasks of the bureaucracy and its general shape were largely determined by the two primary preoccupations of Ottoman statecraft: the sultan’s overriding responsibility to bring justice to his subjects and the collection of revenue to pay the armies and fill the imperial coffers. The second task, clearly bureaucratic, can be associated with what James C. Scott has called ‘legibility’, that is, the ability of those in power to ‘read’ their society, to organize and create categories that will facilitate the process of organization and resource collection. These two elements were intertwined. According to Islamic and Turkic theories of state, the primary duty of the sultan to his subjects (reaya: literally, ‘flock’) was the provision of justice, especially against the harassment of the local ruling authorities or of illegal taxation. The resulting concept of ‘circle of justice’ (Adalet Dairesi) perceived the people’s freedom from oppression as a linch-pin in the economic, military and spiritual prosperity of the realm.

The code of laws that gave this theory force as well as defined the division of powers and status in the empire was known as kanun. Kanun – the sultan’s (or ‘secular’) law, as opposed to the religious law of şeriat – harked back to older Turkic traditions in which a conqueror established his own code, the impartial application of which was seen as essential for proper rule. These legislative powers, issued by decree (ferman), were vested solely in the sultan and reveal the workings of ‘the chief officials of the government and Palace, together with their power, promotions, ranks, salaries and pensions, protocols and punishments’. In theory, these decrees could not violate şeriat and were utilized in situations not directly covered by the latter, for example, in the routinization of taxes and elements of criminal justice. The first collection of these sultanic decrees (kanunname) was compiled by Mehmed II (r. 1451–81) to create a formal law code. The kanunname of the Conqueror, the first of which was promulgated shortly after the conquest of Constantinople in 1453,  became the founding text, in a sense, of official Ottoman law (kanuni osmani). Each district (sancak) had its own kanunname that codified the laws and taxes for that region. These laws, as explained further later, often preserved many local customs and brought them in line with Ottoman law. With responsibilities and rights clearly defined and a ministerial obligation to follow the letter of the law, the kanun, theoretically, served to curb the arbitrary power or abuse of the provincial ruling class. The maintenance of justice, with an eye to effective revenue collection, was central to kanun. The members of the kalemiye, especially the chancellor (nişancı), were experts and the foremost authorities on the sultan’s law, and provincial judges (kadı) were responsible for ruling according to both the şeriat and kanun. While kanun could be abrogated, and frequently was as circumstances arose, a reliance on precedence was understood by Ottoman bureaucrats to constitute proper governance.
On the other hand, patrimonial features of the empire had also always been prevalent and were useful to the governance of this vast empire. Perhaps the most basic principles established by the kanun were that the sultan owned all of the empire’s land and had absolute authority over the subjects who lived on it. This established the patrimonial authority of the sultan, yet it allowed for an effectively bureaucratic system of prebends, the timar system, to be put into place in the core of the empire. The Ottoman’s ability to conquer as well as administer its lands relied critically upon cavalrymen (sipahi) from the Balkans and Anatolia. Given the limitations of converting revenues into cash payments, the sipahi were granted permission by the sultan to collect the revenues from a particular village or group of villages in return for annual military service. The sipahi acted as lords over their allotted holdings, collecting their due while also carrying out administrative functions, such as policing and monitoring economic activity. The standard plot awarded for service was a tımar.
Beginning in the sixteenth century, there were around 35,000 tımar, equivalent to half of the empire’s total revenue. On average, the basic administrative unit in the empire, the district (sancak), was made up of around 100 tımars and larger holdings with a population of roughly 100,000 people. The sancaks were administered by district governors (sancak beyis), who fell under the direction of a provincial governor (beylerbeyi) who governed over the entire province (vilayet). In these core (tımarlı) regions, the sipahi rotated every four years or after they had accomplished great successes at war and could become eligible for more land. In theory, rotation forestalled any threat that entrenchment would pose to the palace’s authority or to the safety of the local peasantry. The tımar system was legally made possible by the kanun’s declaration that all landownership rights belonged to the sultan. The combinations of these usufructuary rights coming from patrimonial aspects of rule and rotation of office holders which became established as a bureaucratic principle led to robust control over the provinces until the end of the seventeenth century.
The timar system relied upon careful record-keeping and, therefore, required the services of a salaried group of scribes, the kalemiye to maintain its force. The official register (defter) served as the primary tool of the tımar system. These registers, updated completely every twenty years and supplemented with marginalia in between, recorded the taxable populations and the resources of newly acquired territories through surveys (tahrir). The practice began in earnest in the rule of Mehmed II, although the earliest known defter comes
from Albania in 1431. Even so, the process retained its general shape, even its terminology, well into the seventeenth century. These surveys took note of the population, land use, climate and property values of a sancak: that is, everything related to the taxation of the region. Additionally, bureaucrats recorded the local laws, which, once evaluated by the sultan, were written as a kanunname that served as a preface. These registers are astonishing for their wealth of detail and understanding of the local conditions. For instance, in the
kanuname of the initial register from the northern Aegean island of Limnos, dating from 1490, a scribe explains the best way to assess a husbandry tax:

And as regards the sheep dues [adet-i ağnam]: Because the climate of the island is temperate and it is not excessively cold, they [the peasants] are apparently not accustomed to separating their rams from their ewes. For this reason their lambs are not particular to one season. Were they to be counted along with the sheep it would cause the peasants some distress; because they were desirous of and agreed to pay one akçe per head of sheep, their lambs were not counted with them. It was recorded that only their sheep be counted and that one akçe be paid per head of sheep.
In this way, the peasants of Limnos were able to appeal successfully the implementation of the typical Ottoman sheep tax. Moreover, the tax collector was convinced that the law for the region needed to be aligned more closely to the local conditions to prevent ‘distress’, and thus a potential breakdown of law and order. One might also imagine that the new tax led to more successful collection. Such attention to detail, in the name of both justice and revenue collection, is an Ottoman characteristic witnessed throughout the defter.
Frequently many forms of forced labour were abolished and less burdensome tax systems implemented. By the 1540s, however, most of the core provinces had transitioned to Ottoman codes at their own petition. In many cases, power structures that preceded Ottoman rule were incorporated into the tımar system, paving the way for the Islamicization of Balkan elites. Once incorporated as a district (sancak), judges (kadıs), governors (beys) and treasurers (defterdars) were appointed by the central administration. The kadı and the beğ balanced each other’s power: although every civil and criminal case had to be brought before the kadı, decisions could only be enforced by the beğ.
To be an Ottoman bureaucrat was to be a member of the ruling elite, the askeri. The askeri were broken down by function into three ‘branches’: the scribal service (kalemiye), the military-administrative (seyfiye) and the religious-judicial (ilmiye). In the provinces, the seyfiye and the ilmiye served complementary but separate functions, the former as governors (beğs) and the latter as judges (kadıs). Each had distinct training and career paths that ultimately could cross, in some instances, at the highest level of the government. These elites held privileged status in Ottoman society: as Ottomans (Osmanlı) they were bound generally by an exemption from taxation; a shared culture; mostly Muslim religion; and official language (Osmanlıca), an elaborate amalgamation of Arabic, Persian and Turkish. This was also the lingua franca of the empire – the language of the communications, the administration and commerce. Yet many other languages and local dialects were also spoken and facilitated interactions of an administrative and commercial nature in various regions. The askeri were clearly differentiated from the sultan’s subjects (reaya), the producers and merchants who provided the tax base.
Close to the centre, the household was organized so that power and privilege were determined by proximity to the sultan in the palace, either in his service or as a part of the family, and those in his retinue constituted a fourth, less defined ‘branch’ of government. The servants of the sultan were legally his slaves (kul), many of whom were ‘recruited’ through an institutionalized levy of Christian boys selected from distant Ottoman provinces and converted to Islam (devşirme). Slaves were very much part of the patrimonial household and
used the personal ties and relations they acquired to manoeuver their place in the system. They frequently served at the highest levels of government and married into the sultan’s house. In their training, the kul would graduate to various stations in the palace hierarchy: the most distinguished would take on roles directly serving the sultan in the inner court (Enderun). Eventually they might take on positions of prominence in the outer court (Birun), then as administrators and governors in the provinces or on the imperial council
(divan-ı humayun), the highest deliberative body in the empire. By rotating the most talented and prominent members of his ‘house’ into high posts throughout the core of the empire, the sultan maintained a measure of central authority which acted as a check on the power of local elites.
The core of the divan, which functioned both as a high court and cabinet, consisted of four high officials who each represented a particular branch in the government. The grand vezir, the sultan’s closest adviser and deputy, stood at the head of this administrative apparatus and was charged with all political affairs, especially in matters of war. Next to him were the two chief justices (kadıasker), one for the provinces in Anatolia (Anadolu), the other for those in the Balkans (Rumeli). 30 Finally, there was a head treasurer (başdefterdar), who possessed the last word on the empire’s finances, as well as a chancellor (nişancı). The nişancı and his staff were responsible for ensuring that all orders and letters, including laws that arose from the imperial council, were in accordance with precedent and state regulation. All official documents required the nişancı to affix the royal seal (tuğra or nişan, nişancı is literally ‘the affixer of the seal’). It was the nişancı and the grand vezir who frequently derived and issued kanun. He was also in charge of administering the allotment of tımar, zeamat and has plots as well as carrying out land surveys (tahrir). Furthermore, in the divan a chief secretary (re’isüllkitab) was responsible for scribes in the service of the divan, who carried out official correspondence, assigned landholdings and received petitions. The size of the divan increased over time.
Within this general framework, the kalemiye initially made up a small and undifferentiated office. Documents from the 1530s list a total of around 110 clerks and apprentices under the chancery, treasury and in the divan; the rest of the central administration (the ilmiye and serfiye) contained 25,000 men, excluding the provincial cavalry. The men who worked within the kalemiye were initially drawn from the ilmiye class of religious scholars, literate men trained in the scribal arts. By dint of this literary role, the scribes in the kalemiye, especially from the sixteenth century on, frequently served as custodians of this culture by composing poetry as well as historical, legal and political works. Responsibilities varied depending upon whether one worked for the chancery (katiban-i divan-i hümayun) or the treasury (maliye), as did the specialization of skill. Working under the direction of both the nişancı and the başdefterdar were functionaries in different bureaux, ranging from the management of tax farms and the imperial kitchen to keeping records of provincial petitions and land surveys. Each bureau had a chief (hace) and young men would enter the service as apprentices within established hierarchies. With the right mix of patronage connections (intisab) and ability, the rise through the ranks could be meteoric: for men in the finance or chancery sections this typically meant becoming a bureau chief (hace), but occasionally, and increasingly so from the mid-sixteenth century, higher offices such as chief scribe, head treasurer or even grand vezir were attainable from a strictly bureaucratic background. Initial recruitment to the kalemiye came from the ranks of the askeri, either the descendants or patronage networks of ilmiye, kul or bureaucratic families.
While there is no doubt that most of the administrative developments and bureaucratic routinization described here were ushered in by the mid-sixteenth century in the era of Süleyman, it is important to understand that patrimonial institutions did not have to disappear to become more bureaucratic. As Cornell Fleisher has noted, the narratives of those employed in the scribal service demonstrate an intriguing picture of the complex web of personal and economic relationships through which Süleyman’s government functioned and
brings into relief the degree to which such relationships were recognized as normal, even “legal,” despite the apparent dictates of the logic of the bureaucratized (or, more properly at this point, bureaucratizing) structure within which they developed. Fleisher actually argues that professional categories and membership in those categories were more clearly articulated after the reign of Süleyman.
Following Süleyman’s conquests in the middle of the sixteenth century, the kalemiye underwent a major expansion. By the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the total size of the kalemiye remained just under 1,000 men (heavily weighted to the treasury bureaux) – a tenfold increase from previous decades. The finance and chancery sections developed  distinct career lines, rules of office and expectations on the part of bureaucrats. As a result, it was no longer necessary to have the training of the ilmiye, but only to undergo schooling as a scribe. This development chagrined those bureaucrats brought up in the medrese, who saw the expanding bureaucracy, particularly the influx of reaya into the ranks of the ruling elite, as a sign of the decline of the age. Despite the changes, the legitimacy and duties of the bureaucracy were still based more upon the traditions of the office and kanun, rather than the personal whims of the ruler.
Of course, in a larger sense, the Ottoman empire did function on a patrimonial basis. The polity we term the Ottoman ‘empire’ was known to the Ottomans themselves as the ‘domains of the house of Osman’. Fundamentally, being in charge of the palace meant being in charge of a household. In principle, promotions and privileges were granted solely by the sultan: only he had the power to legislate, and ‘Ottoman budgets’ were, in fact, the purse of the sultan’s house. When the sultan went on campaign, the majority of the court would follow, their hierarchies intact. The broader askeri class, as servants of the sultan, were brought into his household and given privileges that such status conferred.
Of course, as the empire expanded so too did the imperial household, along with its expense. The replication of the imperial household can be observed at every point of the system: the houses of the highest Ottoman officials mimicked that of the sultan, although they varied in degree. Nor were there clear distinctions between ‘public’ office and ‘personal’ gain. Each bureau was allotted an amount of cash per diem by the palace for salaries, although the highest functionaries were granted land from which to earn their income. It was
not uncommon for a bureaucrat to use his position to obtain remuneration outside of his office. Corruption – in the sense of departure from specified rules of
conduct – was a problem especially as the empire and bureaucracy expanded together.
Yet woven into this patrimonial structure was a system that relied heavily upon bureaucrats to carry out the daily decisions and operations of the Ottoman empire. These men operated according to function and within particular hierarchies; were frequently promoted by merit over personal favour; relied heavily on precedence for their actions; and worked, in principle, against the exercise of arbitrary power. The value placed upon their role as representatives of the state is evident in the tracts that criticize later sultans for exercising arbitrary power and, therefore, from deviating from the laws originally set down by Mehmed the Conqueror in his foundational kanunname. To put this in a different way, the Ottoman bureaucracy harboured characteristics of a weberian rational-bureaucratic system.
Contrary to the standard narrative of Ottoman decline, there is compelling evidence that the Ottoman bureaucracy did not stagnate. Instead it went through periods of experimentation and change as various crises arose, especially in the period following the mid-sixteenth century which, in conventional Ottoman historiography, is seen as the beginning of a steady decline. The provincial kadı court records, too, reveal subjects’ continued access to justice not simply on an arbitrary and personal case-by-case basis but by appeal to formalized laws and procedures. Complaints filed by subjects in far-flung provinces against corrupt administrators and governors were resolved by either local kadıs or even by the sultan. Issues of illegal or extortive taxes or complaints against oppression by local rulers could make their way to the divan, receive a hearing and be resolved. While these kinds of rulings on behalf of the less powerful point to effective bureaucratic mechanisms, even more telling is the audacity of the complaints themselves, which signify, at least

for some, a lack of fear of reprisal. This is especially evident in the manner non-Muslims used the Muslim courts to bring their cases against Muslims and relied on the court for fair adjudication. That the cases non-Muslims brought to court were not simply those between themselves and Muslim subjects also demonstrates the reach and reliability of the system. There are many instances, for example, where familial conflicts were brought to court, as when the Jewish merchant brought his brother to court over the expenses related to his commercial trip to the city of Izmir, or when Mariam bt. Antun al-Ashshi came to the Muslim court for help in evicting her mother from the house she owned. The administration of a judicial system on this scale relied not only upon the systematization of law for the reaya and the askeri but also upon a vast array of secretaries and bureaucrats, working under various provincial and imperial bureaux.
While corruption did exist within the bureaucratic ranks, the routinization of function, salary and rank, merit-based promotions and frequent rotation of office all contributed to an imperial administrative complex that, though taking the patrimonial house as its foundational unit and model, tended towards some rationality and efficiency of administration over the core of the empire. These developments set the stage for years of stability, as the empire would, with little exception, maintain its general boundaries until the nineteenth century.
The tension between the patrimonial and the bureaucratic was resolved partly by increasing bureaucratization but also by a calculus of incorporation and slow systematization of state–society relations.

 

[Don Dusko]

Quote

Govoreći o podršci koju su dale poznate ličnosti protestima, Vučić je rekao da su to isti ljudi koji su podržali proteste oko litijuma i da on nema ništa protiv, kao i da se nije pojavilo nijedno novo ime.

"To su isti ljudi koji su podržali litijum - Novak Đoković, Ivana Španović, Bogdan Bogdanović, Željko Obradović... Nemam nikakav problem, to je njihovo pravo. To je demokratija. Nije me niko iznenadio, to su isti ljudi. Ja to prihvatam sportski, ali nemojte da mi oduzimate pravo da mislim drugačije. Teško ćete da me ubedite da je Savo Milošević važniji od Dragana Džajića ili da je Veselin Vuković, za koga se zna da mrzi Srbiju, važniji za Srbiju od Neđe Jovanovića", rekao je predsednik. 

 

[Perkos2]

Veselin Vuković mrzi Srbiju ???

[Smrtokapa]

Naravno da će otac laži pokušati da održi dvomisao među verujućima, ništa me ne čudi od ovoga što izgovara.

 

Samo nastavljati sa pritiskom.

[40Wins]

4 hours ago, DameTime said:

 

BIA i panduri... šljam

 

Pretpostavljao sam da sve vreme BIA ceslja studente i trazi ko su organizatori protesta. Jasno je da ima dosta studenata koji su se prikljucili protestima jer ih je povuklo drustvo, ali mora da ima neko ko artikulise zahteve i organizuje akcije. 

 

Srecom, posto se protest prosirio na veliki broj fakulteta, ne postoji jedan Dzon Konor, vec sigurno postoji dosta mladih koji su zagrizli i ucestvuju u organizaciji, tako da BIA retardima nece pomoci ni scenario iz Terminatora 3, posto mladi (i ludi) na pretnje odgovaraju pozivom novinskih agencija. 

[Dr. Blockhead]

1 hour ago, wrach said:

Malopre sam slusao hirurga koji je jedan u nizu sikaniranih od strane kartela.

 

I jedna situacija koju je ispricao je izazvala u meni odvratan koktel emocija i jos jednom dokazala da je za istinsku promenu u ovom ovde podneblju koje se naziva drzava potrebno MNOGO vise nego sto iko moze i da zamisli.

 

Naime njega su u toku operacije, u krucijalnom trenutku, 2 puta prekidali i insistirali da hitno dodje kod direktora na razgovor. 

Taj stav, mentalitet, nedostatak empatije, ljudskosti i kulture je nesto sto mnogo "ljudi" na ovom podneblju ima. I cak i u idealnom slucaju da sva ova javna lica krivicno odgovaraju, ostace mnogo skrivenih "ljudi" koji ce i dalje realno biti problem.

U te ekstremno nekulturne podljude koji su deo problema, i koji ne poštuju drugog, a naročito drugačijeg, i ima ih mnogo, spadaju i ovi kao iz ovih vesti iz postova, dole su linkovi, koji smišljaju da se obraćaju roditeljima ljudi od 22, 23 itd godine da sa njima "to reše", zato što i ne vide ljude od 22 i 23 godine kao odrasle, nego su za njih "deca" i "mladići" i ljudi od 40 godina. Mada bi i maloletnu decu trebalo poštovati kao osobe i tako ih tretirati, a to je tek strano podljudima. Eno ga jedan nečovek se čak na sav glas baš o deci dere poslednjih dana, i ne odustaje, valjda je to naucio od njegovih Rusa, jer je i kod njih isto, a on je samo javno vidljiv, inače takvih tu ima ne zna im se broj. Ako se kad ovi kad tad padnu i takve stvari ne menjaju, onda će i dalje biti svejedno.

 

Spoiler

 

https://radar.nova.rs/drustvo/agenti-bia-upali-na-posao-majke-studenta/

 

Edited December 26, 2024 by Dr. Blockhead

[DameTime]

45 minutes ago, Don Dusko said:

 

 

Bogdanović i Obradović su poznati podržavaoci litijuma 😂

[PorodicneVrijednosti]

Jao pa koliko je ovaj puko i pao kurcu za usi kad mu je bugojanski kabadahija i alkoholicar Zukan Helez postao neposredna opasnost 

[bergkamp bcd]

12 hours ago, BattleBender said:

 

Bez neke zelje da pojednostavljujem i banalizujem jedan vremenski opseg od vise vekova, ali ono sto sa ove distance deluje kao moral of the story, je da su ti Turci kao svetska imperija pukli bas zbog nemogucnosti da isprate civilizacijske progrese, pre svega tehnoloske i industrijske itd. To se po nekim analiticarima, a meni to deluje jako verovatno, dosta ispoljilo u naoruzanju. Svakako Turci su bili nazadni, kao sto su uvek bili. Citah, a ponovo to ima smisla, Turci kao vodeca svetska imperija i jesu bili mozda civilizacijski najnazadnija imperija u istoriji.

I mi smo ziveli 500 godina pod njima. Dok je svet inventovao parne i pisace masine, mi smo ovde ucili da susimo paprike, pravio sarme i burek pod njihovom cizmom... Gorka pilula za progutati, ali tako je.
A svako malo nas glavni nacin da sebe zavaravamo da imamo bajnu i presvetu istoriju je da se selektivno pozivamo na neke toboze brojke u vidu koliko dugo postojimo mi, a koliko dugo postoji Amerika. "Ma sta Amerika, oni postoje 250 god" (gde naravno SAD-u se racuna samo period od nezavisnosti, a nama od kad je ovde bio Konstantin). Sta smo mi uradili za tih 800,900 godina, pa i nije bas za neku pohvalu...
I jos jednom da se vratim na Turke.... U vreme vazala, dranja koze, nametanja vere i svih tih cuda, sta mislite kakvi su to Srbi opstali i preziveli pod Turcima? Kakvi su to Srbi preziveli Turke? Moja nekakva logicka pretpostavka 90% oni koji su bili "vesti" oportunisti, cinkarosi itd. E, jbg, verovatno to ne moze tako lako da se izbrise kod nas. Nije da mnogo verujem da se takve stvari prenose genetskim putem, ali ako se prenose, let's face it... svi smo mi verovatno potomci nekih cinkarosa. I oportunista.

 

Nisu samo Srbi ziveli pod njima, nego i Albanci i Makedonci i Crnogorci i Bugari i Grci itd.

 

Nema mnogo naroda za koje moze da se kaze da su vec stotinama godina birali prave stvari, dok smo mi birali pogresne. Zapad Evrope je tu gde jeste jer su imali pristup Atlantski okean pa su onda Britanci, Francuzi, Portugalci, Holandjani, Spanci porobili pola sveta.

 

Ono sto je cinjenica je da samo u Srbiji nema pobune protiv vlasti koja krade, laze i nasilno uzima vecinu u parlamentu. Pricajte o Rumuniji, Bugarskoj, pa i o toj Turskoj sta god hocete, tamo postoji neka reakcija u smislu "da ste nas zlatom obasipali, dosta vas je bilo".

 

Ovde nema toga, cak je i Vucic shvatio sta bi trebalo da kaze pa sad malo malo pa izjavi "bilo je puno ljudi, oni su nezadovoljni, to je demokratija, bla bla bla". Sto i jeste tacno, niko i ne tvrdi da su svi ovde za Vucica, naprotiv, samo njemu smeta i ne moze da se iskontrolise, ali realnost je da uvek moze da kaze "ima vas milion, maksimum milion i po koji zelite da glasate protiv mene, nikada me se necete osloboditi".

 

2 hours ago, Don Dusko said:

Lepo se Vucic pokenjao po sportistima koji su podrzali protest.

Voditelj mu pomenuo Bogdana i Zeljka.

 

A on fazonu koga briga za te sutace loptice.

 

Naravno, rec je o istom paceniku koji je ubedjivao decu iz Rijeke da predju da navijaju za "nasa dva velikana", a onda sutradan izadje i kaze kako ta dva velikana mnogo dobijaju od drzave, kako nije fer da drugi klubovi ne dobijaju skoro nista, kako velikane treba privatizovati.

 

Lik je od pocetka usavrsio sizofreniju jer zna da mu niko nece postavljati nezgodna pitanja ("otkud sad ovo, a juce ste izjavili suprotno?"). Malo je stari radikal, malo ugledni evropski drzavnik, malo borac protiv korupcije, malo opozicionar koji se bori protiv zutih lopova, malo vlast koja radi i gradi, cas nasilnik kojem niko ne moze nista, cas zrtva kojeg svi mrze, ali on se ipak sam nekako bori protiv svih.

[Don Dusko]

Ja se nadam ako kosarkasi naprave sledeci uspeh da mu posle ovoga nece ici na docek.

[DameTime]

30 minutes ago, Don Dusko said:

Ja se nadam ako kosarkasi naprave sledeci uspeh da mu posle ovoga nece ici na docek.

 

Možda ovo nije bilo slučajno, fino ga je Bogi iskulirao za zagrljaj i bilo kakav vid prisnosti.

 

 

31 minutes ago, bergkamp bcd said:

Lik je od pocetka usavrsio sizofreniju jer zna da mu niko nece postavljati nezgodna pitanja ("otkud sad ovo, a juce ste izjavili suprotno?"). Malo je stari radikal, malo ugledni evropski drzavnik, malo borac protiv korupcije, malo opozicionar koji se bori protiv zutih lopova, malo vlast koja radi i gradi, cas nasilnik kojem niko ne moze nista, cas zrtva kojeg svi mrze, ali on se ipak sam nekako bori protiv svih.

 

Lepo je neko opisao Vučića u onom dokumentarcu "Država, to sam ja" - on nema identitet. U njegovim obraćanjima se može čuti malo Miloševića, malo Đinđića, malo političkog mu oca Šešelja i Tome Nikolića... 

 

Iliti:

 

Quote

Vođe totalitarnih masa zasnivale su svoju propagandu na, potpuno tačnoj, psihološkoj pretpostavci da se, pod takvim okolnostima, ljudima može učiniti da poveruju u najfantastičnije tvrdnje jednog dana. A zatim računati da će se, ako im se sledećeg dana pruže neoborivi dokazi njihove lažnosti, povući u cinizam; umesto da se odreknu vođa koje su ih lagale, mase bi protestovale da su sve vreme znale da je tvrdnja lažna, a divile bi se vođama zbog njihove superiorne taktičke lukavosti.

[McLeod]

Malo mogu da podelim sa vama kako funkcionisu studenti bar kod mene (mada verujem da je svuda tako) i zbog cega ce ovo targetiranje da im izduva. Ne postoji nikakav vodja. Jedini dogovor je da za svaku tacku na plenumu svi koji zele da budu ukljuceni glasaju kako hoce, ali da onda svi postuju izglasano, ukljucujuci manjinu. Svi koji zele da ucestvuju u glasanju moraju da doprinesu makar kao vodonose, ili pravljenje transparenata ili brainstorming, blokada faksa, sta god, samo da rade nesto. Ne moze niko sad sa ulice da upadne sa indeksom i da se lakta. Takodje, dogovoren je ograniceni kontakt s medijima i da to bude uvek druga osoba, upravo zbog targetiranja. Znam 10+ ljudi koji ucestvuju trenutno u ovome u gimnaziji i na fakultetima i neopisivo sam ponosan na njih. ❤️

[DameTime]

Još malo slika iz Sarajeva. Prelepo je videti da se mladi iz Srbije, Hrvatske i BiH ujedinjuju ❤️

 

[bergkamp bcd]

11 minutes ago, DameTime said:

Lepo je neko opisao Vučića u onom dokumentarcu "Država, to sam ja" - on nema identitet. U njegovim obraćanjima se može čuti malo Miloševića, malo Đinđića, malo političkog mu oca Šešelja i Tome Nikolića...

 

Ima tu i Dinkicevog "gradimo puteve, fabrike, skole, gradimo Srbiju", Tadicevog "Srbija je postovana i cenjena u svetu", itd.

 

Dobar primer sizofrenije je kada je veseli Martinovic u skupstini poceo da cita delove nekog udzbenika sa "gej propagandom", a u sali prisutna Ana Brnabic. I onda ga Maja Gojkovic utisava i prica liku pored sebe "jer on zna da je Ana tu?".

 

I tu se ne slazem sa pricom kako je sve to isti princip, Trump, Orban, Dodik, Vucic. Prva trojica su bili liberali pre 10-15-20 godina (Dodik nekakav socijaldemokrata) koji su skrenuli u desni populizam jer su shvatili da im on moze omoguciti da pobedjuju na izborima. I oni tako i pobedjuju, Dodik da krene opet sa pomirljivom pricom bio bi izbrisan od nekog nacionaliste, Orbana bi smenili Jobikk ili Mi Hazank, Trump bi pukao od nekog Cruza kad bi i dalje tvrdio da se zalaze za pravo na abortus. Vucic je druga prica, narativ oko njega je da cela Srbija treba da ga obozava kao neko bozanstvo, njegova vladavina je ludilo u kojem mi svi treba da zivimo i da budemo jos srecni i zahvalni sto imamo tako jednog Oca nacije.

[40Wins]

 

 

uhuhuhu

[033zero330]

 

Pratim i podižem.

 

 

[fancy]

Eventualni nastavak priče o trolejbusima, EKO busevima, šinobusima i tramvajima - ovde:

 

 

[Don Dusko]

 

Pa naravno da ne postoji.Koja ozbiljna drzava ce da daje ovo?I banke...

[freethrow]

8 hours ago, 40Wins said:

 

 

uhuhuhu

 

Spoiler