Rat u Ukrajini

[Anduril]

On 11/23/2025 at 10:17 AM, djura.net said:

Kog zanimaju tehnoloske inovacije, roboti i AI u ratovanju, tekst sa prve linije fronta

bbc

The fifth brigade's new "toy" is an unmanned ground vehicle (UGV), a robot that provides a lifeline for Ukrainian troops at the front in Pokrovsk and Myrnograd, a strategic hub in eastern Ukraine.

https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cvgkg4zr33lo

 

Ovaj tekst zajedno sa mapom potvrdjuje da je Pokrovsk jedna velika siva zona i veoma dobro objasnjava gde se nalazimo sa ratom dronova. 

Inace, Rubikon, ruska elitna jedinica dronova je sada u tom rejonu u direktnom sukobu sa elitnom dron jedinicom Ukrajinaca. 

Izgleda da Ukrajinci zato sada pocinju masovnije da koriste FP-2 dronove sa 100 kg bojevom glavom duzeg dometa koje je tesko ometati i njima direktno love infrastrukturu Rubikona po pozadini.

To je ta razdaljina od 40 - 200km od fronta koju nova generacija dronova pokriva a koji u grupi sa izvidjackim i presretackim dronovima otvaraju sasvim novu fazu rata.

To i pojava AI dronova presretaca.

 

Sto se tice pregovora, to je samo Trampova distrakcija i tu ce tesko bilo sta da se promeni dok god jedna od strana ne bude u mnogo tezoj situaciji nego danas. 

Mediji i konzumenti ne bi smeli uopste da pridaju paznju tome jer ih on samo peca za svoje interese (odvracanje paznje od sve gore domace situacije).

 

Edited November 24 by Anduril

[djura.net]

5 hours ago, Klotzen said:

Verovatno se pripremaju za propast plana pa ko vele ajde da bacimo krivicu na Vitkofa.

Vitkofa su vec 'guzili' posle Aljaske, navodno je pripremajuci taj samit i  razgovarajuci sa Putinom bez prevodioca potpuno pogresno razumeo sta je Putin nudio. Ako se do to secam, on je razumeo Putina da se slaze sa tim da NATO zemlje rasporede snage po Ukrajni za odrzavanje primirja. Posle je na Aljasci 'odjavio' Trumpa na tu temu kao 2+2.

[Klotzen]

Iz trampovog plana je izbačeno 9 tačaka a neke od ostalih su izmenjene. Sad tu ima gomila nagađanja šta je izbačeno. Navodno je izbačena tačka o 100 milijardi ruskog novca koja će ići na obnovu i 50% profita za SAD (šta god to značilo). Zatim izbačene su tačke o priznanju 3 oblasti kao ruske kao i tačka koja kaže da Ukrajina neće postati članica NATO ali će o tome biti još reči između Zelenskog i Trampa.

 

Ukrajinci su izjavili da su zadovoljni kako protiču razgovori tako da se po tome sumnja da je i tačka o povlačenju iz Donjcke oblasti kao i ograničenje od 600k ljudi u Armiji izbačeno. Moram priznati da ne znam zašto se toliko zanimaju za to ograničenje Armije osim kao stvar principa. Ukrajina je imala manje od 200k ljudi u Armiji pre rata a kada se zbroje svi koji su pod ministarstvom odbrane bilo je negde oko 400k ljudi na tom spisku.

 

Jedna je cifra koliko je na platnom spisku ministarstva odbrane a druga koliko ljudi ima u operativnim jedinicama. Moje je mišljenje da Ukrajina trenutno ima izmeđut 500 i 550k ljudi u operativnim jedinicama. 2024. pre smanjenja godišta za mobilizaciju imali su oko 450k verujem da je sa tim novim mobilizacijama i gubicima u ovih godinu dana mogla da naraste do 500k, eventualno 550k.

[djura.net]

bbc

 

- Six people have been killed in Russian strikes on Kyiv overnight, the city's mayor says, as diplomatic efforts to end the war continue

 

- In Russia, officials says three people have been killed after Ukraine carried out strikes in the border regions of Krasnodar and Rostov

 

- It comes as a US official confirms to the BBC that they will meet Russian representatives in Abu Dhabi today

 

- Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky says that plan now contains "many of the right elements" after negotiations

 

- Further talks are planned in the coming days, and Sir Keir Starmer will host a virtual meeting of Ukraine's allies later

[Henry Chinaski]

ABC news kaže da su Ukrajinci prihvatili onaj promenjeni plan o prekidu rata.

Danas su u Abu Dabiju i Rusi sa Amerikancima, kao i predstavnici Ukrajine. Videćemo hoće li Rusi odbiti.

 

 

[djura.net]

Izgleda da su Britanci prisluskivali Vitkofa i dostavili Bloombergu razgovor i transcript. Ovo je konacno uznemirilo i neke vidjenije Republikance i nateralo ih da se pobune

 

cnn

 

In the October 14 audio recording reviewed and transcribed by Bloomberg, Witkoff counsels top Russian foreign policy adviser Yuri Ushakov on how Russian President Vladimir Putin should approach a call with Trump. The transcript offers key new insight about the behind-the-scenes talks that produced a 28-point peace plan that has been the subject of intense discussions between the Trump administration, Russia and Ukraine in recent days.

 

The transcript generated concern among some GOP Russia hawks on Capitol Hill who asserted that Witkoff was too much under Russia’s spell. Rep. Don Bacon called for him to be fired.

 

“For those who oppose the Russian invasion and want to see Ukraine prevail as a sovereign & democratic country, it is clear that Witkoff fully favors the Russians. He cannot be trusted to lead these negotiations. Would a Russian paid agent do less than he?” Bacon wrote on X.

 

Rep. Brian Fitzpatrick called it “a major problem. And one of the many reasons why these ridiculous side shows and secret meetings need to stop.”

 

[djura.net]

bbc

 

More than 600,000 people in the Kyiv region of Ukraine were without power on Saturday morning after an overnight Russian attack.

 

Ukraine's energy ministry said more than 500,000 of these were in the capital itself, with the rest in the surrounding region. It attributed the power losses to missile and drone strikes on energy infrastructure in the city and several other regions.

 

Around 36 missiles and nearly 600 drones were launched on targets across Ukraine overnight, officials said, killing three and injuring dozens of others.

 

Kyiv's Mayor Vitaly Klitschko said a 13-year-old child was among the 29 people injured in the city.

 

Ukraine's Air Force said it shot down 558 of the drones and 19 of the missiles.

[303]

U proteklih 48 sati, AFU je onesposobio tri tankera i niko više ne želi da pristane.

 

 

[djura.net]

 

 

Kakve njuske. Putin preti i Ukrajni i Evropi.

[Bul-Kathos]

Vrlo važan tekst formalno najobrazovanijeg predsednika jedne države na svetu, Aleksendera Stuba, čija knjiga o međunarodnom poretku se pojavljuje tokom naredne godine.
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/wests-last-chance

 

Spoiler

DECEMBER 2, 2025
The West’s Last Chance
How to Build a New Global Order Before It’s Too
Late
A LE XA N D ER S T U B B
Copyright © 2025 by the Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. All rights reserved. To request permission to distribute or reprint
this article, please visit ForeignAairs.com/Permissions. Source URL: https://www.foreignaairs.com/united-states/wests-
last-chance
The West’s Last Chance
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 1
The West’s Last Chance
How to Build a New Global Order Before It’s Too
Late
A LE XA N D ER S T U B B
he world has changed more in the past four years than in the
previous 30. Our news feeds brim with strife and tragedy. Russia
bombards Ukraine, the Middle East seethes, and wars rage in
Africa. As conicts are on the rise, democracies, it seems, are in demise.
e post–Cold War era is over. Despite the hopes that followed the fall of
the Berlin Wall, the globe did not unite in embracing democracy and
market capitalism. Indeed, the forces that were supposed to bring the
world together—trade, energy, technology, and information—are now
pulling it apart.
We live in a new world of disorder. e liberal, rules-based order that
arose after the end of World War II is now dying. Multilateral
cooperation is giving way to multipolar competition. Opportunistic
transactions seem to matter more than defending international rules.
Great-power competition is back, as the rivalry between China and the
United States sets the frame of geopolitics. But it is not the only force
shaping global order. Emerging middle powers, including Brazil, India,
Mexico, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Turkey, have become
game-changers. Together, they have the economic means and geopolitical
The West’s Last Chance
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 2
heft to tilt the global order toward stability or greater turmoil. ey also
have a reason to demand change: the post–World War II multilateral
system did not adapt to adequately reect their position in the world and
aord them the role that they deserve. A triangular contest among what I
call the global West, the global East, and the global South is taking shape.
In choosing either to strengthen the multilateral system or seek
multipolarity, the global South will decide whether geopolitics in the next
era leans toward cooperation, fragmentation, or domination.
e next ve to ten years will likely determine the world order for
decades to come. Once an order settles in, it tends to stick for a while.
After World War I, a new order lasted two decades. e next order, after
World War II, lasted for four decades. Now, 30 years after the end of the
Cold War, something new is again emerging. is is the last chance for
Western countries to convince the rest of the world that they are capable
of dialogue rather than monologue, consistency rather than double
standards, and cooperation rather than domination. If countries eschew
cooperation for competition, a world of even greater conict looms.
Every state has agency, even small ones such as mine, Finland. e key
is to try to maximize inuence and, with the tools available, push for
solutions. For me, this means doing everything I can to preserve the
liberal world order, even if that system is not in vogue right now.
International institutions and norms provide the framework for global
cooperation. ey need to be updated and reformed to better reect the
growing economic and political power of the global South and the global
East. Western leaders have long talked about the urgency of xing
multilateral institutions such as the United Nations. Now, we must get it
done, starting with rebalancing the power within the UN and other
international bodies such as the World Trade Organization, the
International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank. Without such
changes, the multilateral system as it exists will crumble. at system is
not perfect; it has inherent aws and can never exactly reect the world
around it. But the alternatives are much worse: spheres of inuence, chaos,
and disorder.
The West’s Last Chance
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 3
HISTORY DID NOT END
I started studying political science and international relations at Furman
University in the United States in 1989. e Berlin Wall fell that autumn.
Soon after, Germany reunied, central and eastern Europe escaped the
shackles of communism, and what had been a bipolar world—pitting a
communist and authoritarian Soviet Union against a capitalist and
democratic United States—became a unipolar one. e United States was
now the undisputed superpower. e liberal international order had won.
I was elated at the time. It seemed to me, and to so many others then,
that we stood at the threshold of a brighter age. e political scientist
Francis Fukuyama called that moment “the end of history,” and I wasn’t
the only one to believe that the triumph of liberalism was certain. Most
nation-states would invariably pivot toward democracy, market capitalism,
and freedom. Globalization would lead to economic interdependence. Old
divisions would melt, and the world would become one. Even at the end
of the decade, as I nished my Ph.D. in European integration at the
London School of Economics, this future still seemed imminent.
But that future never arrived. e unipolar moment proved short-lived.
After the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001, the West turned its back on the
basic values that it claimed to uphold. Its commitment to international
law was questioned. U.S.-led interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq failed.
e global nancial crash of 2008 delivered a severe reputational blow to
the West’s economic model, rooted in global markets. e United States
no longer drove global politics alone. China emerged as a superpower
through its skyrocketing manufacturing, exports, and economic growth,
and its rivalry with the United States has since come to dominate
geopolitics. e last decade has also seen the further erosion of
multilateral institutions, growing suspicion and friction regarding free
trade, and intensifying competition over technology.
Russia’s full-scale war of aggression in Ukraine in February 2022 dealt
another body blow to the old order. It was one of the most blatant
violations of the rules-based system since the end of World War II and
certainly the worst Europe had seen. at the culprit was a permanent
The West’s Last Chance
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 4
member of the UN Security Council, which was set up to preserve peace,
was all the more damning. States that were supposed to uphold the system
brought it crashing down.
MULTILATERALISM OR MULTIPOLARIT Y
e international order, however, has not disappeared. Amid the
wreckage, it is shifting from multilateralism to multipolarity.
Multilateralism is a system of global cooperation that rests on
international institutions and common rules. Its key principles apply
equally to all countries, irrespective of size. Multipolarity, by contrast, is
an oligopoly of power. e structure of a multipolar world rests on several,
often competing poles. Dealmaking and agreements among a limited
number of players form the structure of such an order, invariably
weakening common rules and institutions. Multipolarity can lead to ad
hoc and opportunistic behavior and a uid array of alliances based on
states’ real-time self-interest. A multipolar world risks leaving small and
medium-sized countries out—bigger powers make deals over their heads.
Whereas multilateralism leads to order, multipolarity tends toward
disorder and conict.
ere is a growing tension between those who promote multilateralism
and an order based on the rule of law and those who speak the language of
multipolarity and transactionalism. Small states and middle powers, as
well as regional organizations such as the African Union, the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations, the EU, and the South American bloc
Mercosur, promote multilateralism. China, for its part, promotes
multipolarity with shades of multilateralism; it ostensibly endorses
multilateral groupings such as BRICS—the non-Western coalition whose
original members were Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa—
and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization that actually want to give
rise to a more multipolar order. e United States has shifted its emphasis
from multilateralism toward transactionalism but still has commitments to
regional institutions such as NATO. Many states, both big and small, are
pursuing what can be described as a multivectoral foreign policy. In
The West’s Last Chance
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 5
essence, their aim is to diversify their relations with multiple actors rather
than aligning with any one bloc.
A transactional or multivectoral foreign policy is dominated by interests.
Small states, for instance, often balance between great powers: they can
align with China in some areas and side with the United States in others,
all while trying to avoid being dominated by any one actor. Interests drive
the practical choices of states, and this is entirely legitimate. But such an
approach need not eschew values, which should underpin everything a
state does. Even a transactional foreign policy should rest on a core of
fundamental values. ey include the sovereignty and territorial integrity
of states, the prohibition of the use of force, and the respect for human
rights and fundamental freedoms. Countries have, overwhelmingly, a clear
interest in upholding these values and ensuring that violators face real
consequences.
Many countries are rejecting multilateralism in favor of more ad hoc
arrangements and deals. e United States, for instance, is focused on
bilateral trade and business agreements. China uses the Belt and Road
Initiative, its vast global infrastructure investment program, to facilitate
both bilateral diplomacy and economic transactions. e EU is forging
bilateral free trade agreements that risk falling short of World Trade
Organization rules. is, paradoxically, is happening when the world
needs multilateralism more than ever to solve common challenges, such as
climate change, development shortfalls, and the regulation of advanced
technologies. Without a strong multilateral system, all diplomacy becomes
transactional. A multilateral world makes the common good a self-
interest. A multipolar world runs simply on self-interest.
FINLAND’S “ VALUES-BASED REALISM”
Foreign policy is often based on three pillars: values, interests, and power.
ese three elements are key when the balance and dynamics of world
order are changing. I come from a relatively small country with a
population of close to six million people. Although we have one of the
largest defense forces in Europe, our diplomacy is premised on values and
interests. Power, both the hard and the soft kind, is mostly a luxury of the
The West’s Last Chance
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 6
We live in a new
world of disorder.
bigger players. ey can project military and economic power, forcing
smaller players to align with their goals. But small countries can nd
power in cooperating with others. Alliances, groupings, and smart
diplomacy are what give a smaller player inuence well beyond the size of
its military and economy. Often, those alliances are based on shared
values, such as a commitment to human rights and the rule of law.
As a small country bordering an imperial power, Finland has learned
that sometimes a state must set aside some values to protect others, or
simply to survive. Statehood is based on the principles of independence,
sovereignty, and territorial integrity. After World War II, Finland retained
its independence, unlike our Baltic friends that were absorbed by the
Soviet Union. But we lost ten percent of our territory to the Soviet Union,
including the areas where my father and grandparents were born. And,
crucially, we had to give up some sovereignty. Finland was unable to join
international institutions we felt we naturally belonged to, notably the EU
and NATO.
During the Cold War, Finnish foreign policy was dened by “pragmatic
realism.” To keep the Soviet Union from attacking us again, as it had in
1939, we had to compromise our Western values. is era in Finnish
history, which has lent the term “Finlandization” to international
relations, is not one we can be particularly proud of, but we managed to
keep our independence. at experience has made us wary of any
possibility of its repetition. When some suggest that Finlandization might
be a solution for ending the war in Ukraine, I vehemently disagree. Such a
peace would come at too great a cost, what would eectively be the
surrender of sovereignty and territory.
After the end of the Cold War, Finland, like so
many other countries, embraced the idea that the
values of the global West would become the norm
—what I call “values-based idealism.” is allowed
Finland to join the European Union in 1995. At
the same time, Finland made a serious mistake: it decided, voluntarily, to
stay out of NATO. (For the record, I have been an avid advocate of
The West’s Last Chance
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 7
Finnish NATO membership for 30 years.) Some Finns harbored an
idealistic belief that Russia would eventually become a liberal democracy,
so joining NATO was unnecessary. Others feared that Russia would react
badly to Finland joining the alliance. Yet others thought that Finland
contributed to maintaining a balance—and therefore peace—in the Baltic
Sea region by staying out of the alliance. All these reasons turned out to be
wrong, and Finland has adjusted accordingly; it joined NATO after
Russia’s full-scale attack on Ukraine.
at was a decision that followed from both Finland’s values and its
interests. Finland has embraced what I have called “values-based realism”:
committing to a set of universal values based on freedom, fundamental
rights, and international rules while still respecting the realities of the
world’s diversity of cultures and histories. e global West must stay true
to its values but understand that the world’s problems will not be solved
only through collaboration with like-minded countries.
Values-based realism might sound like a contradiction of terms, but it is
not. Two inuential theories of the post–Cold War era seemed to pit
universal values against a more realist assessment of political fault lines.
Fukuyama’s end of history thesis saw the triumph of capitalism over
communism as heralding a world that would become ever more liberal and
market-oriented. e political scientist Samuel Huntington’s vision of a
“clash of civilizations” predicted that the fault lines of geopolitics would
move from ideological dierences to cultural ones. In truth, states can
draw from both understandings in negotiating today’s shifting order. In
crafting foreign policy, governments of the global West can maintain their
faith in democracy and markets without insisting they are universally
applicable; in other places, dierent models may prevail. And even within
the global West, the pursuit of security and the defense of sovereignty will
occasionally make it impossible to strictly adhere to liberal ideals.
Countries should strive for a cooperative world order of values-based
realism, respecting both the rule of law and cultural and political
dierences. For Finland, that means reaching out to the countries of
Africa, Asia, and Latin America to better understand their positions on
The West’s Last Chance
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 8
Russia’s war in Ukraine and other ongoing conicts. It also means holding
pragmatic discussions on an equal footing on important global issues, such
as those to do with technology sharing, raw materials, and climate change.
THE TRIANGLE OF POWER
ree broad regions now make up the global balance of power: the global
West, the global East, and the global South. e global West comprises
roughly 50 countries and has traditionally been led by the United States.
Its members include primarily democratic, market-oriented states in
Europe and North America and their far-ung allies Australia, Japan,
New Zealand, and South Korea. ese countries have typically aimed to
uphold a rules-based multilateral order, even if they disagree on how best
to preserve, reform, or reinvent it.
e global East consists of roughly 25 states led by China. It includes a
network of aligned states—notably Iran, North Korea, and Russia—that
seek to revise or supplant the existing rules-based international order.
ese countries are bound by a common interest, namely, the desire to
reduce the power of the global West.
e global South, comprising many of the world’s developing and
middle-income states from Africa, Latin America, South Asia, and
Southeast Asia (and the majority of the world’s population) spans roughly
125 states. Many of them suered under Western colonialism and then
again as theaters for the proxy wars of the Cold War era. e global South
includes many middle powers or “swing states,” notably Brazil, India,
Indonesia, Kenya, Mexico, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, and South Africa.
Demographic trends, economic development, and the extraction and
export of natural resources drive the ascendance of these states.
e global West and the global East are ghting for the hearts and
minds of the global South. e reason is simple: they understand that the
global South will decide the direction of the new world order. As the West
and the East pull in dierent directions, the South has the swing vote.
e global West cannot simply attract the global South by extolling the
virtues of freedom and democracy; it also needs to fund development
projects, make investments in economic growth, and, most important,
The West’s Last Chance
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 9
give the South a seat at the table and share power. e global East would
be equally mistaken to think that its spending on big infrastructure
projects and direct investment buys it full inuence in the global South.
Love cannot be easily bought. As Indian Foreign Minister
Subrahmanyam Jaishankar has noted, India and other countries in the
global South are not simply sitting on the fence but rather standing on
their own ground.
Finnish President Alexander Stubb in Washington, D.C., October 2025
Kent Nishimura / Reuters
In other words, what both Western and Eastern leaders will need is
values-based realism. Foreign policy is never binary. A policymaker has to
make daily choices that involve both values and interests. Will you buy
weapons from a country that is violating international law? Will you fund
a dictatorship that is ghting terrorism? Will you give aid to a country
that considers homosexuality a crime? Do you trade with a country that
allows the death penalty? Some values are nonnegotiable. ese include
upholding fundamental and human rights, protecting minorities,
The West’s Last Chance
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 10
preserving democracy, and respecting the rule of law. ese values anchor
what the global West should stand for, especially in its appeals to the
global South. At the same time, the global West has to understand that
not everyone shares these values.
e aim of values-based realism is to nd a balance between values and
interests in a way that prioritizes principles but recognizes the limits of a
state’s power when the interests of peace, stability, and security are at
stake. A rules-based world order underpinned by a set of well-functioning
international institutions that enshrine fundamental values remains the
best way to prevent competition leading to collision. But as these
institutions have lost their salience, countries must embrace a harder sense
of realism. Leaders must acknowledge the dierences among countries:
the realities of geography, history, culture, religion, and dierent stages in
economic development. If they want others to better address issues such as
citizens’ rights, environmental practices, and good governance, they
should lead by example and oer support—not lectures.
Values-based realism begins with dignied behavior, with respect for the
views of others and an understanding of dierences. It means
collaboration based on partnerships of equals rather than some historical
perception of what relations among the global West, East, and South
should look like. e way for states to look forward rather than backward
is to focus on important common projects such as infrastructure, trade,
and climate change mitigation and adaptation.
Many obstacles lie before any attempt by the world’s three spheres to
build a global order that at once respects dierences and allows states to
set their national interests in a broader framework of cooperative
international relations. e costs of failure, however, are immense: the rst
half of the twentieth century was warning enough.
Uncertainty is a part of international relations, and never more so than
during the transition of one era into another. e key is to understand why
the change is happening and how to react to it. If the global West reverts
to its old ways of direct or indirect dominance or outright arrogance, it
will lose the battle. If it realizes that the global South will be a key part of
The West’s Last Chance
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 11
the next world order, it just might be able to forge both values-based and
interest-based partnerships that can tackle the main challenges of the
globe. Values-based realism will give the West enough room to navigate
this new age of international relations.
WORLDS TO COME
A set of postwar institutions helped steer the world through its most rapid
era of development and sustained an extraordinary period of relative peace.
Today, they are at risk of collapsing. But they must survive, because a
world based on competition without cooperation will lead to conict. To
survive, however, they must change, because too many states lack agency
in the existing system and, in the absence of change, will divest themselves
from it. ese states can’t be blamed for doing so; the new world order will
not wait.
At least three scenarios could emerge in the decade ahead. In the rst
one, the current disorder would simply persist. ere would still be
elements of the old order left, but respect for international rules and
institutions would be à la carte and mostly based on interests—not innate
values. e capacity to solve major challenges would remain limited, but
the world at least would not devolve into greater chaos. Ending conicts,
however, would become especially dicult because most peace deals
would be transactional and lack the authority that comes with the
imprimatur of the United Nations.
ings could be worse: in a second scenario, the foundations of the
liberal international order—its rules and institutions—would continue to
erode, and the existing order would collapse. e world would move closer
to chaos without a clear nexus of power and with states unable to solve
acute crises, such as famines, pandemics, or conicts. Strongmen,
warlords, and nonstate actors would ll power vacuums left behind by
receding international organizations. Local conicts would risk triggering
wider wars. Stability and predictability would be the exception, not the
norm, in a dog-eat-dog world. Peace mediation would be close to
impossible.
The West’s Last Chance
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 12
e unipolar
moment proved
short-lived.
But it doesn’t have to be that way. In a third scenario, a new symmetry
of power among the global West, East, and South would produce a
rebalanced world order in which countries could deal with the most
pressing global challenges through cooperation and dialogue among
equals. at balance would contain competition and nudge the world
toward greater cooperation on climate, security, and technology issues—
critical challenges that no country can solve alone. In this scenario, the
principles of the UN Charter would prevail, leading to just and lasting
agreements. But for that to happen, international institutions must be
reformed.
Reform begins at the top, namely, in the United
Nations. Reform is always a long and complicated
process, but there are at least three possible changes
that would automatically strengthen the UN and
give agency to those states that feel that they don’t
have enough power in New York, Geneva, Vienna,
or Nairobi.
First, all major continents need to be represented in the UN Security
Council, at all times. It is simply unacceptable that there is no permanent
representation from Africa and Latin America in the Security Council
and that China alone represents Asia. e number of permanent members
should be increased by at least ve: two from Africa, two from Asia, and
one from Latin America.
Second, no single state should have veto power in the Security Council.
e veto was necessary in the aftermath of World War II, but in today’s
world it has incapacitated the Security Council. e UN agencies in
Geneva work well precisely because no single member can prevent them
from doing so.
ird, if a permanent or rotating member of the Security Council
violates the UN Charter, its membership in the UN should be suspended.
is would mean that the body would have suspended Russia after its full-
scale invasion of Ukraine. Such a suspension decision could be taken in
The West’s Last Chance
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 13
the General Assembly. ere should be no room for double standards in
the United Nations.
At the G-20 Leaders’ Summit in Johannesburg, November 2025
Yves Herman / Reuters
Global trade and nancial institutions also need to be updated. e
World Trade Organization, which has been crippled for years by the
paralysis of its dispute settlement mechanism, is still essential. Despite an
increase in free trade agreements outside the WTO’s purview, over 70
percent of global trade is still conducted under the WTO’s “most favored
nation” principle. e point of the multilateral trading system is to ensure
the fair and equitable treatment of all its members. Taris and other
infringements of WTO rules end up hurting everyone. e current reform
process must lead to greater transparency, especially with respect to
subsidies, and exibility in the WTO decision-making processes. And
these reforms must be enacted swiftly; the system will lose credibility if
the WTO remains mired in its current impasse.
The West’s Last Chance
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 14
Reform is hard, and some of these proposals may sound unrealistic. But
so did those made in San Francisco when the United Nations was founded
over 80 years ago. Whether the 193 members of the United Nations
embrace these changes will depend on whether they focus their foreign
policy on values, interests, or power. Sharing power on the basis of values
and interests was the foundation of the creation of the liberal world order
after World War II. It is time to revise the system that has served us so
well for almost a century.
e wildcard for the global West in all of this will be whether the
United States wants to preserve the multilateral world order it has been so
instrumental in building and from which it has beneted so greatly. at
may not be an easy path, given Washington’s withdrawal from key
institutions and agreements, such as the World Health Organization and
the Paris climate agreement, and its newly mercantilist approach to cross-
border trade. e UN system has helped preserve peace between the great
powers, enabling the United States to emerge as the leading geopolitical
power. In many UN institutions, it has taken the leading role and been
able to drive its policy goals very eectively. Global free trade has helped
the United States establish itself as the leading economic power in the
world while also bringing low-cost products to American consumers.
Alliances such as NATO have given the United States military and
political advantages outside its own region. It remains the task of the rest
of the West to convince the Trump administration of the value of both the
postwar institutions and the United States’ active role in them.
e wildcard for the global East will be how China plays its hand on the
world stage. It could take more steps to ll the power vacuums left by the
United States in areas such as free trade, climate change cooperation, and
development. It could try to shape the international institutions it now has
a much stronger foothold in. It might seek to further project power in its
own region. And it might abandon its long-held hide-your-strength and
bide-your-time strategy and decide that the time has come for more
aggressive actions in, for instance, the South China Sea and the Taiwan
Strait.
The West’s Last Chance
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 15
Without a strong
multilateral system,
diplomacy becomes
transactional.
YALTA OR HELSINKI?
An international order, such as that forged by the Roman Empire, can
sometimes survive for centuries. Most of the time, however, it lasts for just
a few decades. Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine marks the beginning
of yet another change in the world order. For young people today, it is
their 1918, 1945, or 1989 moment. e world can take a wrong turn at
these junctures, as happened after World War I, when the League of
Nations was unable to contain great-power competition, resulting in
another bloody world war.
Countries can also get it more or less right, as happened after World
War II with the establishment of the United Nations. at postwar order
did, after all, preserve peace between the two superpowers of the Cold
War, the Soviet Union and the United States. To be sure, that relative
stability came at a high cost for those states that were forced into
submission or suered during proxy conicts. And even as the end of
World War II laid the groundwork for an order that survived for decades,
it also planted the seeds of the current imbalance.
In 1945, the war’s winners met in Yalta, in Crimea. ere, U.S.
President Franklin Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill,
and Soviet leader Joseph Stalin crafted a postwar order based on spheres
of inuence. e UN Security Council would emerge as the stage where
the superpowers could address their dierences, but it oered little space
for others. At Yalta, the big states made a deal over the small ones. at
historical wrong must now be made right.
e 1975 convening of the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe oers a stark
contrast to Yalta. irty-two European countries,
plus Canada, the Soviet Union, and the United
States, met in Helsinki to create a European
security structure based on rules and norms
applicable to all. ey agreed to fundamental
principles governing states’ behavior toward their citizens and one
another. It was a remarkable feat of multilateralism at a time of major
The West’s Last Chance
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 16
tensions, and it became instrumental in precipitating the end of the Cold
War.
Yalta was multipolar in its outcomes, and Helsinki was multilateral.
Now the world faces a choice, and I believe Helsinki oers the right way
forward. e choices we all make in the next decade will dene the world
order for the twenty-rst century.
Small states such as mine are not bystanders in the story. e new order
will be determined by decisions taken by political leaders in both big and
small states, whether democrats, autocrats, or something in between. And
here a particular responsibility falls on the global West, as the architect of
the passing order and still, economically and militarily, the most powerful
global coalition. e way we carry that mantle matters. is is our last
chance.

 

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