Rat u Ukrajini

[MeanMachine]

On 2/10/2026 at 9:16 AM, Klotzen said:

 

Niš i fosfor su slučajevi koji su se desili jednom, mi ovde pričamo o nečemu što traje par godina a u zadnjih par meseci svakih par dana tuku te ciljeve. To je jasan dokaz da cilj jeste uništenje civila.

 

Uništavanje palestinskih naselja nema veze sa ovim. To možemo da porrdimo sa totalnom destrukcijom naselja u Ukrajini ali to je drugi slučaj.

 

Pa naravno da gađaju struju jer to utiče bs moral naroda.

 

Američki dokument koji sam linkovao o tome lepo piše. Struja je legitimni cilj jer se tako lomi moral naroda. Dakle ovo što sad Rusi rade je ono o čemu je pomenuti visoki američki general pričao u procurelom zum razgovoru od pre par godina.

 

[Klotzen]

Pa ništa onda neka Ukrajinci gađaju nuklearne elektrane oko većih ruskih gradova, to će sigurno da spusti moral u Rusiji. Dajte ljudi pročitajte šta pišete, mi ovde pišemo o uništavanju grejanja za 3 milionski grad na -20, to je opasno i za ljude u punoj snazi a da ne pričamo o deci, starijima i bolesnima.

 

Vrlo je prosta definicija ovde. Ako je šteta po civile veća od vojne koristi, dakle VOJNE KORISTI, onda je gađanje takvog cilja ratni zločin. Vojna korist nije pad morala jer da jeste onda je sve legitimna meta, ubijanje dece takođe jer to još više urušava moral protivnika.

 

To što si ti citirao nije dokument, nego školski rad nekog majora koji se školovao za nešto.

[rodriguez]

1 hour ago, MeanMachine said:

 

Pa naravno da gađaju struju jer to utiče bs moral naroda.

 

Američki dokument koji sam linkovao o tome lepo piše. Struja je legitimni cilj jer se tako lomi moral naroda. Dakle ovo što sad Rusi rade je ono o čemu je pomenuti visoki američki general pričao u procurelom zum razgovoru od pre par godina.

 

 

naravno da rusi ništa nisu radili prvi

 

sve je ovo već viđeno, možda na nekoj drugoj skali veličine, ali rusi i originalnost to su dva sveta različita. kasne tačno 30+ godina.

[Tex_Willer]

Rusima oduzimanje starlinka značajno otežava kontrolu dronova, oni imaju 2 3 svoja programa, ali brzina i efektiva istih su daleko od startlinka, čak se navodi da je brzina 10-15x sporija i da je kašnjenje i do sekund.

 

Gledao sam neke njihove grupe i zale se upravo na to, da će morati biti više žrtava ukoliko se želi cilj ostvariti.

[djura.net]

14 hours ago, Klotzen said:

Rusija izgleda gasi Telegram. 

 

Po svemu sudeci, Whatsapp je prva zrtva.

 

bbc

 

Meta-owned WhatsApp said the move aims to push more than 100 million of its app users in Russia to a "state-owned surveillance app".

 

"Trying to isolate over 100 million users from private and secure communication is a backwards step and can only lead to less safety for people in Russia," said WhatsApp in a statement.

 

"We continue to do everything we can to keep users connected."

[djura.net]

DW

 

Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha announced Thursday that Russian oil transit to Eastern Europe via the Ukrainian section of the Druzhba oil pipeline has been suspended since January 27 due to a Russian attack.

 

"This is the Druzhba pipeline infrastructure burning after the latest Russian strike on January 27, which stopped oil transit," he wrote on X, adding photographs of firefighters against a backdrop of flames.

 

Sybiha also said Hungary was preparing to file another complaint about issues with the transit of Russian oil through Druzhba. He advised officials in Budapest to show the photos to their "friends" in Moscow.

[Tex_Willer]

Ukrajinska vojska je u Zaporoskoj oblasti oslobodila nekih 110km², odnosno oslobođeno je 5-6 mesta.

Edited Saturday at 08:21 PM by Tex_Willer

[Tex_Willer]

Časov Jar nije pao, iako su još pre 7 meseci o tome praktično svi izvestili, u južnom delu grada Ukrajinski specijalci su očistili jednu grupu Rusa i nekih 30% grada trenutno Ukrajinska vojska kontroliše, takodje širom fronta Ukrajinci uspevaju linije malo poboljšati i napredovanje Rusa je izrazito malo( a negde i gube oteto).

[Klotzen]

 

 

Ukrajinci su napustili preostale položaje u Mirnohradu, Rivne i Svietle. Verovatno tokom vikenda a sada samo objavljuju. 

[Bul-Kathos]

Spoiler

foreignaffairs.com

The Price of Peace in Ukraine: How Accepting a New Border Could End the War

Peter Slezkine and Joshua Shifrinson

10–13 minutes

Play

Listen to the Article 12 minutes

00:00 / 12:15

MP3 Close audio player

In the four years since Russian President Vladimir Putin launched his “special military operation,” Ukraine and its foreign supporters have consistently framed their objectives in the language of territorial integrity. During the first year of fighting, Western officials explicitly called for the restoration of Ukrainian sovereignty over all its internationally recognized territory, including Crimea and the part of the Donbas that Russia has controlled since 2014. This theory of victory, which was always implausible, collapsed after the failure of Ukraine’s 2023 counteroffensive. Since then, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and most Western leaders have reluctantly conceded that Russia will maintain de facto control over much of the territory that it has conquered. Nevertheless, they continue to categorically reject de jure, or formal, recognition of Ukraine’s altered borders.

The refusal to formally recognize Russia’s territorial control rests on a set of claims about the nature of international relations and the fate of the Ukrainian nation. Opponents of de jure recognition argue that the territorial integrity of countries is a pillar of the postwar order and that this principle cannot be compromised without threatening the stability of the entire international system. Territorial concessions, the thinking goes, will embolden aggressors (whether Russia or others). They also hold that legal cession of territory is tantamount to Ukrainian capitulation, while a policy of nonrecognition preserves the possibility of Ukraine eventually reclaiming lost territory. Each of these arguments is flawed on its own terms. More broadly, reflexive opposition to de jure recognition obscures the ways in which formal acceptance of Russia’s gains on the ground could increase Ukraine’s security, facilitate postwar reconstruction, and contribute to international stability.

As part of a durable peace settlement, it is in the interests of Ukraine, Europe, and the United States to draw a new international border roughly coinciding with the final line of control. Such an arrangement would require both Ukraine and Russia to adjust their constitutional claims to correspond to the territory they actually occupy. While Ukraine would cede territory within its internationally recognized 1991 boundaries, Russia would have to accept a legal border short of the territory it has unilaterally annexed. A deal would also allow for limited, mutually agreed-on adjustments to the line of control, as well as a window of time during which residents in the affected territories could freely relocate to the jurisdiction of their choice. Ideally, the new border would be recognized—and politically guaranteed—by Russia’s partners in BRICS and Ukraine’s principal international supporters.

FALSE PREMISES

The assumption that international order rests on a strong and consistently enforced norm against territorial conquest does not withstand historical scrutiny. Borders have changed repeatedly since 1945, often as a result of conquest. As the political scientist Dan Altman documents in a 2020 study, the rate of successful territorial conquest occurred at a higher rate for much of the postwar era than in the 1930s and 1940s. There is no shortage of examples. Israel seized the Golan Heights during the 1967 Six-Day War. A decade later, North Vietnam conquered South Vietnam and Indonesia wrested control of Timor Leste. Not all of these conquests were formally recognized, but the international system absorbed these changes without unraveling, suggesting that the norm of territorial integrity is more aspirational than essential and that it has always been subordinated to power realities.

In the present case, Ukrainian territorial integrity has already been violated. Russia has constitutionally annexed Crimea, Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia. It currently controls the first two regions completely, along with considerable portions of the other three. It is true that Russia retreated from parts of these regions under Ukrainian pressure in the fall of 2022. Still, the balance of forces has shifted significantly since then, with Moscow now possessing advantages in both manpower and materiel that Ukraine is struggling to counter as Western support wanes. As the war drags on, Russia is more likely to gain ground than to lose it. The West’s nonrecognition of Russian territorial expansion will not reverse the reality of Ukrainian territorial losses.

Nor would a policy of nonrecognition meaningfully constrain Russian behavior or deter aggressors elsewhere. International refusal to recognize Russia’s control of Crimea did not stop Putin from invading Ukraine in February 2022. More broadly, actions in one part of the world are not strongly connected to other states’ calculations farther afield. The decision to risk direct military action is driven by perceived costs, capabilities, and strategic interests, not legal precedent. Tellingly, even as Western and Ukrainian officials have vigorously opposed formal changes of Ukrainian territory, concerns about potential aggression in regions such as the Middle East and East Asia have remained pronounced. In any case, Russia’s experience in Ukraine—four years of grinding war producing gains far short of what the Kremlin had hoped to achieve—hardly offers a compelling model for would-be revisionists.

Meanwhile, the objection that de jure recognition would amount to Ukrainian capitulation leaves little room for victory. If the war’s stakes are defined in territorial terms, then Ukraine has already lost. Yet this is not the only way to frame Ukrainian and Western objectives. Immediately after Russia’s full-scale invasion, the priority for Ukraine and its international backers was the preservation of the country’s independence and sovereignty. By this standard, Ukraine has already succeeded. Moreover, it has established close economic, political, and strategic links with the European Union. Such ties have delivered the longtime demands of Ukraine’s Euromaidan protesters, who in 2013–14 sought acknowledgment of their “European choice.” Formally recognizing the existence of a new international border with Russia does not jeopardize these achievements. In fact, Ukraine might have a better chance of further integrating with the West if it relinquishes legal claim to territory it does not control in the east.

Finally, Ukraine’s ability to reclaim control over its 1991 territory does not depend on whether the new border is legally recognized or accepted de facto. A renegotiation is always possible if and when the distribution of power changes. For half a century, the West refused to recognize the Soviet Union’s 1940 annexation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—a policy that produced no results—while acknowledging the Soviet status of the other 12 republics. In the end, all 15 republics gained independence peacefully. Ultimately, the main obstacle to the restoration of Ukraine’s 1991 territory is Russia’s refusal to relinquish its territorial claims and its capacity to enforce them, not the politics of recognition in Kyiv and other European capitals.

THE SUREST PATH

Not only are the arguments against de jure recognition unfounded, but the case against formally adjusting the border overlooks the benefits that could follow. Multiple studies have found that, compared with other kinds of interstate disagreements, territorial disputes have a greater probability of escalating to armed conflict. Consider South Asia, where Afghanistan, China, India, and Pakistan have all clashed over contested territory. Even ostensibly “frozen” conflicts, such as the one between North and South Korea, remain heavily militarized and primed for escalation.

Conversely, de jure recognition may help curtail the likelihood of future conflict. Europe’s peaceful postwar order, for instance, began with a substantial redrawing of international borders following the violence of World War II. Post-Soviet Central Asia provides a more recent example. Like South Asia, this region was riven by complex territorial disputes and frequent border conflicts. Since 2017, a series of border settlements involving Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan have contributed to increased stability and economic growth throughout the area.

In the specific case of Russia and Ukraine, formal recognition of a new international border would likely bring immediate security benefits. A clearly defined dividing line would make it simpler to determine responsibility for a resumption of hostilities. This would facilitate so-called snapback sanctions on Russia and renewed military support to Ukraine in case of unprovoked military action by Moscow, strengthening deterrence. Furthermore, a mutually recognized border might enable both sides to accept reciprocal troop withdrawals, lowering the likelihood of inadvertent escalation. In the event that conflict does break out, the aggressor’s foreign partners would be less likely to support the invasion if they had explicitly recognized a new border. Finally, formal recognition would help deprive nationalist forces in both countries of a key argument for resuming fighting and seeking further territorial changes.

Beyond the security arena, an internationally recognized Russian-Ukrainian border could ease Ukraine’s path toward further Western integration and facilitate postwar reconstruction. Ukraine’s accession to the European Union will be difficult under any circumstances, but it will be far more complicated if the country’s eastern boundary remains undefined, unstable, and heavily militarized. Border settlement could also improve Ukraine’s postwar economic prospects. Legal certainty over borders would make the country more attractive for large-scale private investment, which will be essential for reconstruction. Persistent ambiguity, by contrast, would deter capital and lock Ukraine into a permanent high-risk environment.

It may be tempting to maintain the illusion of Ukraine’s territorial integrity, but any peace deal that preserves a mismatch between de jure claims and de facto control will hinder reconstruction efforts and increase the likelihood of renewed conflict. After four years of a grinding war, the surest path to an enduring peace is a deal in which both Ukraine and Russia recognize the reality on the ground and renounce legal claim to territory that they do not control.

Tekst iz Foreign Affairsa reflektuje prelazak dela zapadne strateške misli sa logike pobede ka logici upravljanja štetom. To je značajan indikator promene percepcije rata u policy zajednici i signal da se rasprava pomera sa pitanja „kako Ukrajina može vratiti teritoriju“ ka pitanju „kako definisati stabilan evropski bezbednosni poredak posle rata“.

[HAMMER]

ova pitanja ne iskljucuju jedno drugo jer vracanje okupiranih teritorija i uzimanje novih bi izazvao pravi zemljotres evropske bezbednosti pa samim tim se i spekulise i izvode potezi koji izazivaju najmanje talasanja.